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ABSTRACT 
Malicious software represents a significant and growing threat to Department of Defense 
systems.  Threats to airborne systems in particular can be characterized not by system 
vulnerability to Internet-based exploits, but rather by the risk posed by malicious code 
already present in the system’s software.  Although there are software techniques to 
detect and prevent certain types of attacks, a Systems Engineer has access to system level 
information and system design techniques that can quantify and in many cases mitigate 
the risks posed by potential malicious code present in the system.  These techniques are 
especially applicable to malicious code in embedded airborne system, although they can 
be applied to other systems that share certain traits. 
This thesis provides an overview of the types of threat involved; techniques that 
can be used to detect malicious code in individual aircraft Weapons Replaceable 
Assemblies (WRAs); risks and mitigation strategies related to a generic aircraft software 
development process; system level techniques to prevent embedded malicious software 
from causing harm in aircraft; and a technique for documenting Software Assurance 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Many of today’s (2011) systems are software intensive.  This represents a threat to the 
safety and security of those who use such systems because: 
• Software directly controls many safety critical system elements—there is 
often no “man in the loop” 
• It is easy to write software that will fail in predetermined ways 
• It is difficult to detect malicious code in software 
• It is possible to compromise most existing software if it is accessible across a 
network.   
Since embedded systems used in aircraft control many critical aspects of an 
aircraft (the engine, flight controls, navigation), malicious software has the potential to 
cause catastrophic system failures.  Failure of software in a Full Authority Digital 
Electronic Controller (FADEC) is believed to be responsible for the crash of a Chinook 
helicopter resulting in deaths of 25 intelligence personnel and a four-person Special 
Forces crew.  According to General Shepperd, when F-22 Raptors crossed the 
international dateline for the first time, they lost most of their systems: 
All systems dumped and when I say all systems, I mean all systems, their 
navigation, part of their communications, their fuel systems. They were—
they could have been in real trouble. They were with their tankers. The 
tankers—they tried to reset their systems, couldn’t get them reset. The 
tankers brought them back to Hawaii. This could have been real serious. It 
certainly could have been real serious if the weather had been bad. It 
turned out OK. It was fixed in 48 hours. It was a computer glitch in the 
millions of lines of code, somebody made an error in a couple lines of the 
code and everything goes. 
 
 xiv 
  A software failure in the Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) of an Airbus 
A330–300 caused Qantas flight 72, from Singapore to Perth to change attitude violently 
“throwing passengers around the cabin.”  This resulted in the injury of seventy 
passengers, ten of whom required hospitalization. 
  Although none of these incidents are believed to be the result of malicious code, 
they illustrate the risks posed by software in airborne systems.  Had an attacker with 
access to the source code wished to cause problems such as these, they would have been 
able to—and the problems would almost certainly have been blamed on a simple coding 
error.  
 Writing software that is resistant to these threats is not taught as part of standard 
computer science curriculums.  Further, even well written software provides no 
protection against malicious code that is part of a system’s source code. 
Malicious software built into the source code of a system is difficult to detect and 
can pass typical software testing procedures used for safety critical elements of airborne 
systems such as those mandated by the FAA’s DO-178B.  The skills required to write 
such code are widely available and programmers without these skills can using existing 
tools to add malicious code to software.  Such tools are designed to insert malicious code 
in such a way as to be difficult to detect by both programmers and static analysis tools. 
Much of the research today (2011) centers around how to prevent software that is 
connected to the Internet from being exploited and little information is available on 
techniques to prevent or detect malicious code already present in source code.  Existing 
static analysis tools do a poor job of detecting malicious code and cannot provide 
assurance that no malicious code remains.  While quite powerful, dynamic analysis 
techniques also lack the ability to guarantee that no malicious code has gone undetected. 
This thesis breaks malicious code down into two primary categories: 
vulnerabilities in the system (where an attacker with access to the system can exploit it in 
real time) and pre-exploited software (where malicious code is already present in a 
system).  The pre-exploited case is further broken down into two main categories: overt 
 xv 
malicious code (where the dangerous code is clearly visible in the source code); and 
covert malicious code (where the dangerous code is not obvious to a casual review of the 
source code—and may not even be in the source code but will nonetheless be present 
within the Weapon Replaceable Assembly (WRA) load image).  The WRAs are also 
categorized based on how they are used within the system architecture.  WRAs with no 
external (off aircraft) connections can only have potential vulnerabilities exploited by 
other WRAs. 
The extremely limited external connectivity of many aircraft WRAs means that in 
most cases, potential vulnerabilities can be discounted.  Further, specific safety related 
WRA and system level testing used for many WRAs within an aircraft prevent some 
types of malicious code embedded in the WRA. 
The safety critical nature of many aircraft WRAs limits our ability to use more 
aggressive run-time detection and prevention techniques.  As a result, these systems are 
ideal targets for covert malicious code.  However, due to the safety critical nature of the 
WRAs, it is possible to leverage existing development requirements to obtain secure 
systems at a lower cost.  Safety critical systems will tend to have a MIL-STD 882 hazard 
analysis performed that identifies which system elements can cause the most damage.  
Commercial requirements such as DO-178B have specific development requirements for 
each element that depend on similar risk analysis approaches (e.g., ARP 4145A). 
Since attackers need pre-exploited WRAs to fail when the system is in use, and to 
not fail during WRA or system test (where the damage would be contained), the attack 
will depend on some type of “trigger” based information available to the malicious code 
in the WRA.  This trigger will be used by the malicious code to determine when to fail.  
As Systems Engineers, we are able to prevent malicious code from causing harm by 
limiting the information it can receive.  For example, if an aircraft engine controller 
tracked the number of hours it had been in use, malicious code might cause it to fail only 
after 200 hrs.  A Systems Engineer can often prevent this type of information from being 
available to the WRA.  If such malicious code is present in a WRA and it cannot 
determine how long the WRA has been in use, it has two options: always fail; or never 
 xvi 
fail.  In the “always fail” case, the problem will be detected during normal testing.  In the 
“never fail” case we cannot tell if malicious code is present—but if it is present it does no 
harm.  In practice things are not quite so simple due to the possibility of statistical based 
triggers. 
 Unfortunately, some WRAs require access to potential trigger information.  For 
example, a flight management computer needs to know many pieces of potential trigger 
information (altitude, location).  For WRAs where we are unable to limit information that 
could be used to trigger malicious code, the WRA is decomposed into its elements to 
reduce the amount of software that needs other, more complicated techniques to mitigate 
the risk.  An overview of static and dynamic analysis techniques is presented—
unfortunately these techniques are not able to guarantee the absence of malicious code 
(although dynamic analysis in particular is quite powerful).  Thus such elements within 
these WRAs represent residual Software Assurance risk. 
 For programs where the software has not yet been developed, a basic software 
development process is discussed and analyzed yielding eleven places in the process 
where an attacker has an opportunity to insert malicious code.  Mitigation strategies are 
then provided for each threat type. 
 Once the software baseline and toolset is believed safe to use, it is important to be 
able to detect any malicious changes to this baseline.  To this end a technique using 
cryptographic hashes and digital signatures is presented that is able to identify all changes 
in the source code, libraries and tools used to build the system software.  Two simple 
shell scripts to implement this approach on UNIX and UNIX-like systems are provided. 
 Finally, a formal method to document Software Assurance (SwA) cases based on 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) along the lines used for documenting System Safety 
cases is proposed. 
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Many of today’s (2011) systems are software intensive.  This represents a threat 
to the safety and security of those who use such systems because software implements 
safety critical functionality within many systems; it is easy to write software that will fail 
in predetermined ways; and it is possible to compromise most existing software if it is 
accessible across a network. 
Software that fails in predetermined ways (malicious code) is difficult to detect 
and can pass typical software testing procedures used in safety critical elements of 
airborne systems such as those mandated by the FAA’s DO-178B.  The skills required to 
write such code are widely available and only the knowledge of how high-level code 
actually runs on the hardware is necessary to implement malicious code.  Computer 
science curriculums include assembly language programming that provides such 
knowledge, as do many classes in electrical or computer engineering that include 
programming microcontrollers.  Samples of such code are available on the Internet so the 
required skills can be acquired if desired.  There are even contests to see who can write 
the best malicious code that can pass a security review (e.g., 
http://underhanded.xcott.com).  Note that the capability is language independent, 
although different languages require different techniques. 
Although there has been increased awareness of threats to software across a 
network interface, much of the software in use today contains vulnerabilities that make it 
possible for an attacker to exploit the software if it is connected to a network.  Figure 1 
was generated from data available from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 





software bugs that can be used to exploit the system the software runs on.  Although this 
data cannot be used to rate the safety of specific vendors,1 it is clear that vulnerabilities 
are an ongoing problem. 
 
Figure 1 - Vulnerability Statistics 
Writing software that can survive a deliberate attack requires skills that are not 
generally taught as part of a computer science degree.  Stanford University offers a set of 
six courses in Advanced Computer Security; however these require not only a B.S. in 
Computer Science but also a background in security 
(http://scpd.stanford.edu/search/publicCourseSearchDetails.do?method=load&courseId=
1284836). 
At any given time, there are a number of known vulnerabilities in software that 
are not publicly disclosed nor fixed.  One vulnerability research site listed 125 such 
vulnerabilities as of June 2011 (Zero Day Initiative, 2011).  Some of these vulnerabilities 
were known for two years prior to being fixed by the vendor (Tipping Point, 2011). 
There is a financial incentive for hackers to attack systems.  Although the size of 
the underground economy is unknown, researchers and cybersecurity firms pay for 
                                                 
1 The data not only groups software errors across product families (e.g. Windows OSes) but also 
includes programs that come with the operating system (e.g. Free Operating Systems such as Linux and 
































security flaws.  Greenberg (2010) states that Netragard (a cybersecurity firm) pays 
between $15,000 and $115,000 for a security flaw in the Apple Mac. 
Some security flaws are used to steal information such as credit card information, 
bank account access information, etc.  A Trojan Horse is a type of malware that pretends 
to be a useful program (and may actually be useful) while it steals information from the 
computer it runs on.  Panda Security (2010) states that “Five years ago, there were only 
92,000 strains of malware cataloged throughout the company’s 15-year history. This 
figure rose to 14 million by 2008 and 60 million by 2010, which gives a good indication 
of the rate of growth.”  Of these instances of malware, 49% were Trojans overall and for 
new 2010 malware, 71% were Trojans. 
Even if when vulnerability is known, it is not clear that a vendor will report it 
(and thus protect the product users).  Vendors have a disincentive to report 
vulnerabilities.  According to Telang and Wattal (2007), vendors lose on average $0.86 
billion (in terms of stock price) on the day a vulnerability is announced. 
An attack across a network could also compromise embedded software that will 
not be used in a networked environment.  For example, Ragan (2011) reports that at least 
three government defense contractors (including Lockheed Martin, L-3, and an 
unconfirmed breach at Northrup Grumman) have been attacked through the use of 
SecurID technology.  SecureID is a security token provided by RSA that allows 
employees to access their internal network securely (RSA 2011).  Theoretically, without 
access to the security token, access is not possible due to the encryption used.  However, 
a security breach at RSA in March allowed the attackers to penetrate the networks.  RSA 
(2011) states that “we were able to confirm that information taken from RSA in March 
had been used as an element of an attempted broader attack on Lockheed Martin, a major 
U.S. government defense contractor.” 
 4 
2. Risks Posed by Malicious Code in Embedded Systems 
a. In General 
One question that might arise is “how much damage could malicious 
software do”?  The answer to this is not as simple as a worst case failure mode.  Instead, 
we must assume that the software will actively control hardware to yield the worst 
possible outcome.  As an example, software that controls a pipeline may not seem to 
represent a significant threat, yet the damage can be enormous.  According to Weiss 
(2000), the CIA implemented a program to sabotage plans and software that they 
expected the Soviets to steal.  Safire (2004) reported on one example of this program 
where software used to control a pipeline was sabotaged with malicious code prior to its 
theft.  ‘‘The pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was 
programmed to go haywire,’’ states Reed in Safire (2008), ‘‘to reset pump speeds and 
valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and 
welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen 
from space.’’ 
Malicious code can also be used to sabotage industrial development.  One 
recent (2010) example is the Stuxnet worm.  The Stuxnet worm infected Windows PCs 
via USB memory sticks.  Once present, it looked for a specific configuration of Siemens 
Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) units.  The PLC units control motors and other 
hardware.  If an exact match was not found, the worm did no damage (Fildes, 2010).   
  According to Symantec (cited in Fildes, 2010), nearly 60% of all Stuxnet 
infections were in Iran.  President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (quoted in Reuters, 2010), 
stated that enemies of Iran used computer code to make “limited” problems for 
centrifuges involved in uranium enrichment at some of its nuclear sites.  “They succeeded 
in creating problems for a limited number of our centrifuges with the software they had 
installed in electronic parts.”  Nonetheless, it is believed that Stuxnet specifically targeted 
the model IR-1 centrifuges used at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz and destroyed 
one thousand (1,000) of the approximately nine thousand (9,000) in use at the site 
(Albright, Brannan, & Walrond, 2010). 
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  According to Broad, Markoff, & Sanger (2011), the Stuxnet worm was “a 
joint American and Israeli effort to undermine Iran’s efforts to make a bomb.”  The 
Dimona complex in the Negev desert duplicated the nuclear centrifuges Iran was using to 
enrich uranium.  The worm had two major functions.  “One was designed to send Iran’s 
nuclear centrifuges spinning wildly out of control. Another seems right out of the movies: 
The computer program also secretly recorded what normal operations at the nuclear plant 
looked like, then played those readings back to plant operators, like a pre-recorded 
security tape in a bank heist, so that it would appear that everything was operating 
normally while the centrifuges were actually tearing themselves apart.” 
This type of targeted attack represents a serious threat.  According to 
Ralph Langner (quoted in Broad, Markoff, & Sanger, 2011), Stuxnet represents a “new 
form of industrial warfare, one to which the United States is also highly vulnerable.”  In 
2009, the U.S. Government admitted that Chinese and Russian spies had infiltrated 
systems controlling the Nation’s power grid and left software behind that could destroy 
software infrastructure (Gorman, 2009). 
b. Risks Posed to Embedded Airborne Systems in Particular 
Airborne systems contain many critical systems.  One of the most critical 
is the engine.  In many aircraft, a computer called a Full Authority Digital Engine 
Controller (FADEC) controls the engines, not the pilot.  A FADEC has “no form of 
manual override available, placing full authority over the operating parameters of the 
engine in the hands of the computer” (“FADEC,” n.d.).  According to (Safram, 2011), an 
Electronic Engine Control (EEC) manufacturer, “FADECs currently equip over 3000 
commercial planes.”  It is important to note that although a simple software failure could 
result in an engine shutdown, malicious code in an EEC or FADEC could cause far more 
damage.  Because the EEC or FADEC control all engine parameters, it is possible for 
them to cause the engine to be permanently damaged and in some cases, operate with 
reverse thrust.  One method used by System Engineers to guard against EEC and FADEC 
failures is to use two systems in parallel, the idea being that if one fails, the other can 
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continue to operate the engine.  However, in the case of malicious code, both controllers 
can be made to fail at the same time (i.e., the redundancy will not provide increased 
safety). 
The Chinook’s Full Authority Digital Electronic Control (FADEC) 
software controlled the helicopter’s engines and is implicated in a 1994 crash of a Boeing 
Chinook helicopter that killed 25 intelligence personnel and a four-person Special Forces 
crew.  A 1993 review of the FADEC software by EDS-SCICON found 485 anomalies 
after examining only 18 per cent of the software code.  “Errors caused unexpected engine 
shutdowns, as well as surges in power that resulted in engines completely blowing out” 
(King, 2011).  Although the crash was initially blamed on pilot error in 1995, a recent 
(2010) independent inquiry, commissioned by the British Government assigns blame to 
the FADEC.  Since the original findings, additional documents have come to light 
including one “written on the day of the crash,” which “contained a warning by IT 
experts and airworthiness assessors at MoD Boscombe Down that the Chinook Mk2 
should not be in the air” (King, 2011). 
In another example, ten F-22 Raptors suffered a navigational failure 
during their first foreign deployment (Johnson, 2007).  According to General Shepperd 
(as stated in Roberts, 2007), when F-22 Raptors, on their way from an Air Force base in 
Hawaii to an Air Force base in Japan, crossed the international dateline they encountered 
a serious software error. 
All systems dumped and when I say all systems, I mean all systems, their 
navigation, part of their communications, their fuel systems. They were—
they could have been in real trouble. They were with their tankers. The 
tankers - they tried to reset their systems, couldn’t get them reset. The 
tankers brought them back to Hawaii. This could have been real serious. It 
certainly could have been real serious if the weather had been bad. It 
turned out OK. It was fixed in 48 hours. It was a computer glitch in the 
millions of lines of code, somebody made an error in a couple lines of the 
code and everything goes. 
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Problems in one subsystem can affect the system as a whole in dangerous 
ways.  For example, a computer failure injured over 70 people including “14 people with 
serious, but not life-threatening, injuries” when Qantas flight 72, from Singapore to Perth, 
caused the Airbus A330–300 to suddenly change altitude.  “… the sudden drop sent the 
plane into a nosedive, throwing passengers around the cabin” (Packham, B., Dunn, M., 
2008).  According to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (2008), the incident was the 
result of a software failure in an Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU).  Although 
the ADIRU detected and reported an internal fault (causing the auto-pilot to disengage), 
two minutes later “ADIRU 1 generated very high, random and incorrect values for the 
aircrafts angle of attack.”  These faulty angle of attack values caused the flight control 
computer to immediately drop the nose of the aircraft by 8.5 degrees (although the auto-
pilot was disengaged, the fly-by-wire system still overrode the pilots).  The ADIRU 
continued to generate “random spikes” of lesser magnitude.  Another ADIRU failed in a 
different Airbus A330–303 two months later however the pilots were able to turn of the 
unit before it could cause harm. 
Although these problems are believed to be the result of accidental coding 
errors, they illustrate the risks posed by malicious software in airborne systems. 
3. Embedded Software used in Airborne Systems 
a. Software Safety Considerations 
 Unlike general purpose software, software intended for use in airborne 
systems has specific safety considerations.  Because software in certain parts of the 
aircraft has the ability to result in loss of life, both the process employed during software 
development and the testing requirements are necessarily more involved than software 
intended for some other purposes (e.g., a video game, a word processor, …).  Although 
these safety considerations do not eliminate software assurance issues, in many cases the 
steps required for software safety issues can be leveraged to reduce the software 
assurance effort.  For example, the Configuration Management (CM) approach used for 
software safety related issues can be leveraged. 
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One common commercial approach to software safety is the FAA’s DO-178B 
document. 
b. DO-178B Requirements 
DO-178B (Software Considerations in Airborne Systems and Equipment 
Certifications.) is a widely used commercial standard for developing airborne software.  
The document specifies a set of Process Objectives that should be complied with when 
developing the software.  The specific Process Objectives to be met are based on the 
results of a safety assessment.  This assessment results in a Design Assurance Level 
(DAL) assignment from level A through level E as follows: 
Level A – Catastrophic 
Level B – Hazardous/Severe-Major 
Level C – Major 
Level D – Minor 
Level E – No Effect 
Level A implies that the aircraft will be unable to continue flying and 
unable to land safely.  The failure of a level A box can be considered likely to result in 
the death of one or more people.  Level B implies that death may result but it is likely that 
serious injuries will be sustained.  Level C implies discomfort with the possibility of 
serious injury.  Level D implies that some inconvenience may occur and E (as named) 
will not affect the operation of the aircraft (RTCA, Inc, 1992). 
  Because of the severity of WRA failures with Level A through Level C 
software, DO-178B requires that every line of the software be executed as part of the 
acceptance test suite (statement coverage).  Level B and Level A add progressively more 
rigor to this process by requiring extra testing of all the branch points in the software.  If 
the software is thoroughly tested, with every possible line being executed and the 
software behaved normally, it is assumed that the software is reliable.  The implicit 
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assumption being made by DO-178B is that any software errors are accidental.  Note that 
if an attacker wants to insert malicious code into a Level A through Level C box that is 
tested according to DO-178B, they must either insert the malicious code after testing or 
they must write the malicious code in such a way that it will work normally during testing 
yet fail in operation.  This second approach is discussed later in the section titled “Trigger 
Concept” (p. 54). 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop strategies that can be used to generate 
software releases that are safe and secure for their intended use.  Specifically, the 
software must work safely and reliably and be free of “exploitable vulnerabilities.” 
In order to achieve this, we need to have high confidence that either there is no 
malicious software present in the WRA, or that if malicious code is present, that it cannot 
do any damage.  Note in particular that in most cases we are not trying to guarantee that 
no malicious code is present, but instead have simplified the problem by requiring that if 
malicious code is present that it can do no damage.  If malicious code is present in the 
system but never does anything malicious, the system will operate correctly.  This 
approach requires the Systems Engineer to be aware of and control the environment in 
which the software – that potentially contains malicious code – operates. 
In addition, we need to have confidence that the WRA software is not exploitable, 
or if it is exploitable, that there is no way for an attacker to exploit it.  Again, this second 
simplification means that we may use software that might contain vulnerabilities but that 
the Systems Engineer must assure specific criteria are met in order to use the software 
safely. 
Although there are many techniques to find actual and potential software errors, 
finding (or not finding) errors does not tell us anything about how much (if any) 
malicious code remains in the software.  We need to be able to state with some degree of 
certainty that the software is safe to use in our specific environment. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on my research, I will answer the following questions in this thesis: 
• How can a System Engineer mitigate the risks posed by malicious code in 
embedded systems used in aircraft?  
• What methods can we use to detect the presence of malicious code in 
embedded systems used in aircraft? 
• How can we reduce the risk that malicious code will be inserted into the 
source code for embedded systems used in aircraft? 
• How can we prevent malicious code in embedded systems used in aircraft 
from causing harm? 
• How can we maintain the integrity of the software in an embedded 
system? 
D. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study allows a Systems Engineer to bound the problems associated with 
malicious code in embedded systems in aircraft.  By more fully understanding the issues, 
risks, and threats, a Systems Engineer can determine which risks are acceptable and 
which must be mitigated.  This thesis also provides an approach for categorizing the risks 
along with specific approaches that can be used as a framework to mitigate each of the 
risk categories.  Threats during development and mitigation strategies to mitigate these 
threats are also presented.  Methods of verifying that a software codebase is unchanged— 
and identifying any changes is presented.  Finally, a technique to document the Software 
Assurance (SwA) effort is presented. 
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E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the scope and methodology for this thesis.  The scope 
specifies the specific areas researched and the applicability of the thesis to specific 
concerns related the malicious code.  The methodology describes the approach used to 
answer the research questions 
1. Scope 
The analysis presented here is limited to embedded software used for airborne 
applications.  Although the framework can be extended to other types of systems, many 
of the assumptions made are specific to aircraft systems and would need to be re-visited 
for other types of software. 
2. Methodology 
The main research question was broken down into four sub-questions.  Each of 
these questions was then independently researched.  In order to answer each of the 
research questions, the same basic approach was followed: 
• Gather background information – Even before performing literature 
searches on the specific question, it was necessary to understand certain 
background material.  For example, it was necessary to understand 
computer architectures prior to researching memory segment layouts and 
types of malicious software attacks.  Similarly, it was necessary to 
understand basic software development processes before researching 
development processes related to airborne software development.  
• Literature Searches – Once the background was understood, it was 
necessary to search the literature for existing research on both the scope of 
the problem and current approaches to dealing with the problem.  For 
example, searches were performed to determine current (2011) approaches 
to detecting malicious code. 
• Analysis – Based on the results obtained from the literature searches, it 
was necessary to analyze the results to determine which elements were 
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adequately covered and which were missing.  For example, it became 
clear that existing techniques to locate malicious code did not yield 
complete or even quantifiable coverage results. 
• Alternate approaches – When specific shortcomings were detected in the 
available approaches, alternate approaches were developed and presented.  
For example, the method of blocking “trigger information” was developed 
as an alternate approach.  In some cases, alternate techniques from other 
disciplines were adopted such as the use of Goal Structuring Notation 
(GSN) for documenting Software Assurance (SwA) cases. 
• Synthesis – Elements obtained from literature searches were combined 
with elements developed as parts of alternate approaches to provide an 
overall approach to parts of the overall problem.  The overall approach to 
mitigating malicious code in a system and the method of maintaining trust 
in the software after verification are examples of this technique. 
• Testing – In some cases, it was necessary to test an approach.  For 
example, the simple scripts to generate and verify a cryptographic 
“snapshot” were tested to verify that they operate correctly. 
Since there was significant overlap in the results, this thesis presents the results in 
terms of: the threat; the model used to perform the analysis; mitigation strategies; gaining 
and maintaining software integrity; and documenting the Software Assurance (SwA) 
process rather than ordering according the research questions.  It is hoped that this 
ordering will be easier to follow and more useful to a System Engineer. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF SYSTEM PROBLEM SPACE 
A. NOTIONAL SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE 
For the purposes of this thesis, a generic system architecture for airborne systems 
and use this as a basis for understanding the types of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
mitigation strategies that apply to the problem.  This architecture will initially be 
considered in terms of the physical architecture comprised of Weapons Replaceable 
Assemblies (WRAs)—(aka Boxes) and their connections.  Figure 2 shows a notional 
generic physical architecture.  WRAs are categorized as either external or internal 
depending on whether they have an interface that crosses the system boundary.  
Interfaces between WRAs are categorized as either bidirectional or unidirectional 
depending of possible information flow across the interface.  It is important to distinguish 
between interfaces where information is only intended to flow in a single direction and 
interfaces where information is only capable of flowing in a single direction.  A 
unidirectional interface is one where information physically cannot flow in two 





























Figure 2 - System Architecture (Physical) 
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Interfaces where it is physically possible to send any information in both 
directions will be treated as bi-directional interfaces.  This will be the case even when the 
logical interface would be considered a uni-directional interface.  Consider a simple 
(logically) unidirectional parallel port interface.  The computer will set eight bits on the 
output and then strobe a transfer line to tell the receiver that the data is ready.  Although 
this might appear to be a uni-directional channel, the receiver controls an output line that 
is an input to the computer.  This output line is intended to tell the computer whether it 
can setup for the next eight bits.  However, there is nothing to physically prevent the 
receiver from switching this line high and low to transmit information back into the 
computer.  In practice, a parallel port also includes other lines that are intended to pass 
information back such as the “out of paper” line.  Special cables have been built that 
allow this “uni-directional” interface to act as a bi-directional network connection.  These 
are even available commercially (http://www.nullmodem.com/LapLink.htm). 
The architecture can also be thought of in terms of Computer Software 
Configuration Items (CSCIs).  Since it is possible to load multiple CSCIs onto the same 
hardware, it is not possible to analyze input channels based solely on the CSCI 
architecture.  Nonetheless, the CSCI architecture within each WRA can be useful when 
we wish to assess the pedigree of the software in each CSCI. 
  In some cases, a WRA consists of multiple hardware modules that contain 
software.  In these cases, the WRA can be sub-divided into sub-WRAs (where each sub-
WRA contains a processor) and the inputs for each sub-WRA can then be analyzed (as 
was done with the WRAs in the system).  
 B. SYSTEM LEVEL THREATS 
This section discusses external threats to an aircraft in flight, discussion of 
attempts to insert malicious code into the software baseline during development and 
maintenance are covered in Chapter V (p. 65) and Chapter VII (p. 78). 
In flight, an aircraft has a limited number of inputs.  Many of these inputs are not 
capable of being used for an attack.  For example, most radio communication represents 
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analog signals.  The radio that a pilot uses to talk to the tower has a voice interface (note 
that we are concerned with attacks on the aircraft systems here, not potential “social 
engineering” attacks on the pilots—even though the pilots can be considered to be part of 
the overall system).  A VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR) navigation system uses a 
phased analog signal to indicate bearing.  Although an attacker could modify the VOR 
transmitter, the aircraft system would simply read the transmitted value, and not be 
damaged per se.  The same logic applies to RADAR systems.  Of course, RADAR 
systems that receive embedded digital data might be vulnerable since unexpected data 
sequences could theoretically exploit a vulnerability in the receiver.  This is unlikely but 
each RADAR receiver must be evaluated to make sure that no combination of inputs 
could result in a compromise. 
This is not to say that purely analog inputs can be considered safe.  In the late 
1960s and early 1970s, a hacker named John Draper alias Cap’n Crunch used a toy 
whistle from a Captain Crunch cereal box to place free phone calls.  This was possible 
because AT&T used a 2600 Hz tone to signal that a trunk line was available and ready to 
accept a call.  This signal disconnected one end of the trunk so Draper could act as the 
operator.  The toy whistle happened to emit this tone (“John Draper,” n.d.). 
Thus to be certain that the aircraft will be free of potential attack vectors, every 
input must be scrutinized.  A method of formalizing this process is presented in Chapter 
VIII. 
Although the Internet may appear to represent the largest potential threat, as a 
general rule, aircraft system Avionics are not connected to the Internet so external attacks 
via the Internet are generally infeasible.  However, this may not always be the case.  
When Boeing designed the 787 Dreamliner, their design “for the first time, connects a 
passenger Internet network with networks that control the plane’s navigation and 
maintenance systems” (Zetter, 2008).  This implies that a passenger laptop could 
theoretically affect the aircraft control systems. 
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According to Kuhl (2008), Boeing stated that “the problem was fixed before the 
FAA issued its warning.”  However, this is not really adequate.  Jonathan Ezor (as quoted 
in Kuhl, 2008) states that “Any time you have a physical connection (between computer 
networks), there is a possibility someone could bridge from one to the other” 
C. WEAPONS REPLACEABLE ASSEMBLY (WRA) THREATS 
WRAs can be attacked from outside of the system boundary or from inside the 
system boundary.  In some cases, a WRA can be directly attacked, and in others, due to a 
lack of physical access, only indirect attacks are possible.  We’ll refer to an attack that 
originates from outside the system boundary as a direct or first level attack.  If an external 
WRA must be first be compromised in order to attack another (usually internal) WRA, 
we’ll refer to the attack as an indirect or second level attack.  Obviously each WRA, once 
compromised, could be made to attack another WRA that could not be directly attacked 






















And so on …
System Boundary  
Figure 3 - External Direct and Indirect Attacks 
In the case of an external attack, the externally accessible WRA must be 
vulnerable to the specific attack being used.  Furthermore, in the case of a multi-level 
attack, not only must the first WRA be vulnerable, but each WRA in the chain must be 
vulnerable.  In other words, to attack an internal WRA, an attacker must exploit a 
vulnerability in the external WRA and then exploit a (probably different) vulnerability in 
the internal WRA.  Thus multi-level attacks are significantly more difficult than single 
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level attacks.  As a consequence, it may be significantly less effort for an attacker to 
simply insert malicious code directly into the internal WRA, either in the source code or 
by replacing the WRA image with a malicious image.  We’ll refer to these WRAs as pre-
exploited. 
Attacks may also come from within the system boundary.  If a pre-exploited 
WRA contains malicious code, it can do direct damage (by making that WRA behave 



















AttackAnd so on …
System Boundary
 
Figure 4 - Internal Direct and Indirect Threats 
 We’ll use the same terminology for direct and indirect attacks when the source of 
the attack is an internally compromised WRA. 
D. ANALYSIS 
Airborne systems have a number of architectural characteristics that limit the 
ability of an external attacker to compromise the WRAs that comprise such a system.  An 
attacker needs both a vulnerability and a physical connection to a WRA in order to 
successfully attack it.  Further, this physical connection must be, at a minimum, uni-
directional allowing information to flow from the attacker to the WRA.  It is important to 
realize that it is not necessary for a bi-directional interface to exist.  If the goal of an 
attack is to damage the system, no response from the compromised WRA is required.  As 
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an example, consider the “Ping Of Death (POD).”   This is a specially formatted Internet 
Protocol (IP) message that is sent to a computer that causes the computer to crash (“Ping 
of death,” n.d.). 
Not all WRAs used in airborne systems are vulnerable to attack (although they 
may contain malicious code).  Some WRAs only provide an output channel (e.g., altitude 
sensors) and in some cases this is implemented with a physical interface that only passes 
information out of the WRA.  In these cases, an attacker will not be able to attack the 
WRA during use.  Even when an input channel is present, it may not represent a 




Indicator Light Temperature  
Figure 5 - De-Icing System 
Although there are two inputs to the WRA, the On/Off control may be 
implemented as a discrete (e.g., 0 VDC or 5 VDC).  The Temperature input may be the 
output of a thermocouple and provide a linear voltage (e.g., 0–12 VDC) as an input.  In 
this case, even though there are two inputs to the WRA, it is likely that neither is suitable 
as a way to attack the WRA.  In the case of the on/off switch, the WRA can be expected 
to survive having the pilot turn the system on and off, even rapidly, without causing a 
problem.  In the case of the temperature input, this originates from hardware such as a 
thermocouple that an attacker will not be able to manipulate in real-time – even if such 
manipulation would be capable of compromising the WRA.  Note that although it is 
unlikely that simply turning the system on and off quickly would be capable of 
compromising it, it is at least theoretically possible (such manipulation might, for 
example, overflow the interrupt stack).  However, as shown later in “Attacker 
Requirements” (p. 53), this type of attack will not usually be acceptable to an attacker.   
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Because it is difficult for an attacker to compromise an airborne WRA using an 
external attack, an attacker could choose to “pre-exploit” the WRA by inserting malicious 
code into the WRA prior to its use.  Since there are many ways for an attacker to insert 
malicious code into a WRA, and many of these methods are relatively easy to use, this 
thesis will concentrate on this type of threat.  The CVE – Common Vulnerabilities and 
Exposures website provides a compendium of vulnerabilities that are relevant to WRAs 
connected directly to the outside world via the Internet (http://cve.mitre.org/).  For other 
types of input, each input must be scrutinized for its potential to exploit a WRA. 
Unfortunately, there are many places an attacker can hide malicious code within 
an airborne WRA.  The WRA contains one or more Computer Software Configuration 
Items (CSCIs).  Each of these contains executable code and data.  The executable code 
consists of directly translated source code plus: 
• Library code that the source is linked to 
• Glue Code inserted by the compiler 
• Anything in the memory of the WRA that the program can be “tricked” into 
transferring control to. 
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III. OVERVIEW OF WEAPONS REPLACEABLE ASSEMBLY 
(WRA) PROBLEM SPACE 
A. ENVIRONMENT MODEL USED 
Today (2011), within each WRA that can potentially be compromised through the 
use of malicious code, there is at least one Central Processing Unit (CPU) and one 
physical memory space.  These may be implemented as multiple components or 
integrated into a single chip (as could be the case for a microcontroller, ASIC, or FPGA 










Figure 6 - Simple WRA Model 
Some WRAs may contain multiple CPUs and physical memory spaces.  When 
CPUs and Memories are isolated within the WRA, each can be treated as a set of WRAs 
in the sense that the external sub-WRA would need to be vulnerable for an attacker to 

























Figure 7 - WRA Model with Multiple Sub-WRAs 
There is also a more complicated case where multiple CPUs can address the same 
physical memory.  Execution threads are discussed are below and this case can be treated 
as a single CPU with multiple execution threads. 
1. Memory Spaces 
 One key aspect of WRA memory usage with regards to malicious code 
involves how the physical memory is utilized.  Three main models are considered: a Von 
Neumann architecture; a Harvard architecture; and a WRA that includes some type of 
memory management hardware that limits access to a smaller segment of physical 
memory.  For our purposes, the key difference between these has to do with whether or 
not the data space can be “executed” by the CPU.  Figure 8 shows an example of memory 
space utilization inside a WRA.  The memory is typically divided into five segments: 
• Text – this holds the compiled executable program that the WRA is 
executing.  In general, this does not change during execution unless an 
error has occurred or there is malicious code involved.  Although such 
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“self modifying code” can be written, it is typically not allowed for 
airborne systems 
• Data – this holds initialized data for the program that the WRA will run.  
Its contents may or may not be altered by the program during execution 
• BSS – this holds uninitialized data for the program the WRA will run.  Its 
contents will be altered by the program as it runs. 
• Heap – this holds dynamically allocated memory.  The Operating System 
(or Executive) will allocate data as requested by the WRA program during 
execution. 
• Stack – this holds temporary data used by the program as it executes.  
Typically this holds local variables associated with functions and 
procedures as well as keeping track of return locations as one function or 








Holds local variables and 
function/procedure return addresses
Holds dynamically allocated variables
Holds statically allocated variables 
(that are initially empty)
Holds statically allocated variables 
(that are initially non-zero)
Holds compiled executable code
 
Figure 8 - Memory Segments 
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  The dashed lines in between the memory segments in Figure 8 may 
represent either an actual physical boundary or simply a design/run-time choice made by 
the programmer for each segment of memory.  In the case of a Von Neumann 
architecture, there is nothing to prevent executable code from being stored in any of the 
segments.  In the case of a Harvard Architecture, the memory containing the executable 
code is physically separate from the data, BSS, heap, and stack memory.  In the case of a 
WRA that has a Memory Management Unit (MMU), the sections of memory may be 
separated physically by programming the MMU to limit access outside of certain 
addresses for certain purposes.  For example, the MMU could be programmed to allow 
read access but not write access to the code space.  It could allow the CPU to read 
executable instructions from the text segment but not from the data segment.  A typical 
protection scheme would be to specify that segments are W^X (Write exclusive or 
Execute) which means that any memory segment that the CPU can read executable 
instructions from cannot be written. 
These techniques were implemented primarily to limit the possibility of 
accidentally executing data or modifying the executable software – it is possible for an 
attacker to get around each case.  Neither limiting segment access and use nor putting the 
software into Read Only Memory (ROM) provides adequate protection against malicious 
code exploiting a vulnerability.  For example, in (Checkoway, Halderman, Feldman, 
Felten, Kantor, & Shacham, 2009), the authors demonstrate the use of Return-Oriented 
Programming to execute arbitrary code on a Sequoia AVC Advantage voting machine 
utilizing a Harvard Architecture.  They accomplished this without modifying the ROM 
based executable code and introduced the malicious code to the machine using a 
modified voting card.  Thus, even though they did not change the executable program 
embedded in the voting machine’s ROM, and the system only executed instructions that 
were in ROM, they were still able to execute any program they wanted through 
manipulation of the stack. 
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2. Execution Threads 
 Although a WRA may contain a significant amount of software, until a 
Central Processing Unit (CPU) actually reads and executes the software, the software is 
nothing more than data stored in memory.  Consider the section of WRA memory shown 
in Figure 9.  The same section of memory is shown twice, with the left side showing the 

























Figure 9 - Data vs Executable Instructions 
  Note that we cannot tell by examining address 0x1AF02 whether the byte 
(0x1F in this case) represents data, an executable instruction, or part of an executable 
instruction.  There are several reasons for this.  First, certain processors mix instructions 
and data.  Second, some processors use a variable number of bytes per instruction.  A 
simple instruction (such as to clear a register) might be a single byte while a complex 
instruction (such as an indirect memory reference) might use many bytes. 
  If the byte is intended to be read by the CPU as an instruction and 
executed, then it is an instruction, otherwise it is data.  Also note that it does not matter 
where the byte is stored (i.e., Text, Data, BSS, Heap, or Stack segment).  If it is loaded 
into the CPU as an instruction, then it is an instruction and will be executed.  In a typical 
                                                 
2 The leading “0x” indicates that the number is in hexadecimal format. 
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scenario, the CPU will read an instruction, execute it, and then read the next instruction.  
Certain instructions cause the CPU to read the next instruction for some location other 
than the next sequential address.  A trivial example is shown on the right hand side of 
Figure 9.  The flow of instructions that are actually executed represents the execution 
thread.  This example shows an execution thread that contains a branch instruction in that 
some instructions are skipped (rather than simply executing all instructions in order). 
  The execution thread need not simply execute or skip instructions, it can 
also go to another location in memory and then return.  This behavior is shown in Figure 
10.  Instead of proceeding directly from address 0x100 to address 0x101, the execution 
thread goes from 0x0100 to a subroutine at address 0x153.  When the subroutine is 
complete, then execution continues at location 0x101.  In order to return to the next 
location in memory past the location that the subroutine was called from (in this case 
0x101), the CPU needs to store the location to return to somewhere in memory.  In 
general, this is stored in the memory space allocated to the stack.  Note that subroutines 
can call other subroutines so a number of memory locations must be available to hold 














Figure 10 - Subroutine Call 
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  As can be seen, the execution thread traces the path through memory 
showing which addresses in memory are executed and in what order.  In addition, it 
should be clear that unless the execution thread traces through an address, the instruction 
at that location will not be executed. 
  Since bytes in memory are just data until executed, unless the execution 
thread passes through the malicious code, the malicious code cannot do any harm.  Figure 
11 shows a section of memory that contains malicious code and an execution thread that 








Figure 11 - Inert Malicious Code 
  Since the WRA operates correctly most of the time (otherwise it would be 
immediately obvious that the WRA was broken), only a small percentage of the bytes 
contained in the WRA will cause malicious behavior.  Thus, in order to cause a problem, 
an attacker must make sure that the malicious code (data stored in memory that will do 
something malicious) is loaded into the CPU as an executable instruction. 
B. VULNERABILITY THREATS 
A vulnerability associated with software in a WRA represents an error in the 
software that allows an attacker to insert malicious code into the WRA during operation.  
These are generally the result of a programming error based on an assumption that the 
input will never fall outside of some expected range (although no mechanism is in place 
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to enforce this behavior).  As long as the inputs fall within the expected range, the 
program will operate normally.  By deliberately supplying the program with illegal input 
values, an attacker can cause the program to fail, often in predictable ways. 
Each vulnerability represents an opportunity for an attacker to exploit the 
software.  Note that the vulnerability may exist due to a programming error or may have 













WRAIf the Load Image is Vulnerable 
(or Exploitable) and an attacker 
has a way to access the WRA, 
then they can inject malicious 
code when desired
 
Figure 12 - Injected Malicious Code 
One common type of vulnerability involves the size of data buffers allocated 
within the software.  A data buffer refers at an array of values and has a fixed size3.  If 
the program copies user input into the data buffer but does not verify that the amount of 
data copied fits within the buffer, a buffer overflow can occur.  In practice, this means 
that an attacker can have data is written into memory outside of the buffer.  According to 
Erickson (2003, p. 23) if enough extra data is written past the end of the buffer, the 
memory being overwritten will eventually be in the “stack” segment.  As discussed in the 
subroutine call overview, the stack segment holds the address that the execution thread 
should continue at when the subroutine ends.  Figure 13 illustrates a stack based type of 
buffer overflow attack.  In this example, the attacker uses malicious code followed by the 
address of the buffer being overwritten as the data written into the buffer.  When the 
                                                 
3 Arrays can also be dynamic, but at any point in time they have a fixed size. 
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current subroutine ends, instead of returning to address 0x101, execution continues at 
address 0x357 (the address of the array).  Since the array actually contains executable 
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Figure 13 - Stack Based Buffer Overflow 
There are many variations of this type of attack but the details are beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
There are many examples of this type of attack.    Microsoft (2004) describes an 
interesting version of this attack in a security bulletin where the malicious code was 
inserted into a JPEG image file.  Because the Microsoft code assumed that the file size 
information was correct in an image file, they only allocated a buffer large enough to 
hold the reported image size, not the actual image size.  By deliberately corrupting the 
image size information in the file, attackers were able to take advantage of this 
programming error.  When the image size information was set to a smaller value than 
required, the “image data” overwrote the return address and caused a jump to the 
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malicious code.  Because programs such as Microsoft Outlook® used the broken routine 
to display images, it was possible for an attacker to compromise a Windows machine 
simply by sending an e-mail with an attached image file.  Outlook’s automatic preview 
feature tried to display the image and automatically transferred control to the malicious 
code embedded in the image. 
Since these vulnerabilities are often easy to overlook and if found can be mistaken 
for simple programming errors, an attacker may choose to maliciously insert such a 
vulnerability so that it can later be exploited.  However, in the case of embedded airborne 
systems, only WRAs with an external interface (input channel) are directly vulnerable.  It 
is possible for an attacker to attack a WRA with an external interface and then use that 
WRA to attack a WRA with only internal interfaces, but as mentioned this type of multi-
level attack is much more difficult as it requires knowledge of more than one WRA.  
Note also that the attack requires a successful attack on any intervening WRAs as well. 
C. EMBEDDED MALICIOUS CODE THREATS 
Four types of malicious code are considered for embedded airborne systems.  
These include: overt malicious code, covert malicious code, a malicious load image, and 
injected malicious code.  Each type is detailed below. 
1. Overt Malicious Code 
The easiest way an attacker can use to include malicious code into software is to 
simply place it directly in the source code for the software.  The small notional code 
fragment show in Figure 14 illustrates this approach.  Essentially, the attacker needs to 
determine when the program should behave maliciously.  If the program always acted 
maliciously, it would immediately be detected the first time the program was run.  Thus, 
if an attacker wants the program to pass some basic level of testing, the program can only 
fail under certain conditions.  Note that there is also an implied requirement that the 
execution thread must pass through this malicious code or the malicious code will never 
even get an opportunity to check if the condition is met. 
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Figure 14 - Example of Overt Malicious Code 
One specific problem for the attacker that wants to use overt malicious code is 
that anyone reviewing the software will notice it.  In many cases it is common practice to 
have a team review software after it is written but before it is used.  In this case, the 
malicious code would be detected. 
In the specific case of airborne avionics, it is common practice for every single 
line of software to be executed during testing.  For example, the DO-178B standard 
requires this for any software designated as Level A, Level B, or Level C.  As a 
consequence, the “Do Something Bad” code would be executed during testing and be 
detected.  This implies that under a DO-178B development effort, we have a significant 
defense against overt malicious code for any safety critical (level A-C) WRA.  Note that 
it is possible for an attacker to replace the tested code with code containing malicious 
code after testing is complete.  This is discussed in Chapter V.  (p. 65).  Although this 
type of testing is expensive, it is an effective way to mitigate the risk of overt malicious 
code.   
According to Hilderman (2011), a DO-178B level C development effort costs 
approximately 30% more than a level D development effort (that is considered roughly 
equivalent to “any non-certified commercial software process”).  Further, due to earlier 
bug detection, integration tends to be 50–75% faster than non-DO-178B efforts.  Thus 
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requiring statement coverage (or even a full DO-178B level C development process) may 
be a reasonable alternative for certain applications. 
2. Covert Malicious Code 
Because overt malicious code is difficult for an attacker to use in the airborne 
environment, they may choose hide the malicious code instead.  They might do this by 
writing software that looks normal but is actually malicious.  They may also choose to 
hide the malicious code outside of the text memory segment (e.g., in the data segment) 
such that it does not even look like code.   In these cases, an experienced programmer 
may examine the code and not notice a problem.  Unfortunately, this is not that hard to do 
in practice.  The Underhanded C Contest (http://underhanded.xcott.com) is a yearly 
contest to see which programmer can write the most innocuous looking malicious code.  
The threats posed by covert malicious code are divided into two broad categories: 
compromised execution thread; and compromised data 
a. Compromised Execution Thread 
There are multiple ways for a compromised execution thread to cause a 
problem.  We’ve broken these down into three threat types: 
• Controlled execution thread – In this type, the malicious code 
executes specific malicious instructions.  An example of this is the 
Stuxnet worm discussed earlier. 
• Uncontrolled execution thread – In this type, the malicious code 
does not do anything specific, it simply causes the software to 
crash.  In many applications, this can be catastrophic.  Consider a 
Fly-by-wire system where a pilot moves an electronic control and a 
computer actually moves the flight control surfaces.  If the 
computer crashes, the pilot loses control of the aircraft. 
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• Hardware interference – In this type, the malicious software affects 
the behavior of hardware in the WRA to cause a failure elsewhere.  
Referring back to Figure 7, we can see that if the hardware that 
connects parts of the WRA internally fail, the WRA will fail.  This 
might be accomplished by modifying the value of a hardware 
register on an interface chip.  In a bus arrangement, the malicious 
code could request and not release the bus, preventing all of the 
other system components from communicating. 
  Each of these types requires some amount of malicious code to be 
embedded in the main body of the software.  In the case of an uncontrolled execution 
thread, only a small amount of malicious code need be present.  This code will determine 
if it is appropriate to crash the WRA.  The other forms also require code to determine if it 
is appropriate to behave maliciously.  Remember that if the WRA crashes or fails every 
time it is used, the malicious code will be detected during testing. 
   In each case, the code which determines whether it is appropriate 
to act maliciously must be executed (or it will never have the opportunity to cause the 
malicious behavior). Put another way, part of the malicious code must operate every time 
the WRA runs but not cause the WRA to fail every time.  If this part of the code is never 
executed, then the malicious code will be inert – it will never be able to cause harm. 
   There are multiple methods an attacker can use to embed malicious 
code into a WRA.  These revolve around where the code will be hidden and whether the 
code is simply placed in the space or created/inserted during execution.  For example: 
• Malicious code embedded in the text segment 
• Malicious code dynamically inserted into the text segment 
• Malicious code embedded in the data segment 
• Malicious code dynamically inserted into data segment 
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• Malicious code embedded in BSS segment 
• Malicious code dynamically inserted into BSS segment 
• Malicious code embedded in heap segment 
• Malicious code dynamically inserted into heap space 
• Malicious code embedded in stack space 
• Malicious code embedded into free memory 
• Malicious code dynamically inserted into memory mapped 
hardware registers 
• Malicious code dynamically inserted into free memory 
• Combinations 
   Note that some Operating Systems/Executives will zero out unused 
memory (e.g., free memory, the stack segment, the heap segment).  When this is the case, 
an attacker cannot pre-load these areas with malicious code but must dynamically copy it 
there at runtime (if they want to locate the malicious code there). 
b. Compromised Data 
By taking advantage of an implicit vulnerability in the software, an 
attacker can cause malicious behavior.  This type of vulnerability need not be the result of 
a programming error.  When the data being compromised is part of the program itself, it 
is assumed that it is written correctly.  I.e., the programmer is assuming that they do not 
need to guard against other programmers and there is no need to guard against illegal 
input because the software is not receiving input per se. 
An attacker may modify data that is used to program hardware in the 
WRA.  For example, they might adjust bus timing parameters to lock-up communication 
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between hardware elements within the WRA.  In some cases, communication messages 
are built using a template.  Such a template might specify a standard message header and 
the software would fill in the template when it is time to send a message.  Since the 
template may be required to specify things such as a message size, an attacker may be 
able to change the template to cause problems.  A programmer using the template may 
not check the template for validity since it does not represent external input. In practice, 
all internal data may not checked each time it is used due to the processing overhead. 
3. Malicious Load Image 
In addition to the software itself containing malicious code, a System Engineer 
must be sure that the final software image used in a WRA is either free from malicious 
code or that any malicious software present can do no harm. 
Even when the source code is clean (i.e., free from malicious code), an attacker 
may be able to replace the load image built from the clean source code with a different 
load image containing malicious code as in Figure 15.  This image can contain overt 
malicious code since no one will review the source used to build the malicious load 
image.  This applies whether we are obtaining the load image from a WRA vendor or 
developing the WRA software ourselves.  By paying attention to the software custody 
chain (as discussed in Chapter V [p. 65] later in this thesis), a System Engineer can often 
eliminate this risk.   
How do we know 
load image hasn’t 
been replaced?










The Load Image must 
be programmed into 
the WRA to use it
 
Figure 15 - Replacing Load Image with Malicious Version 
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Another way an attacker can insert malicious code into the load image is to 
modify part of the software toolchain that generates the load image.  Thompson (1984) 
demonstrates that it is trivial to write a malicious compiler in such a way that even when 
the source code for the compiler is clean, if used to re-compile itself, the resulting 
compiler will still be malicious.  He does this by having the malicious compiler 
executable insert malicious source code into the clean compiler source code as it is being 
compiled.  Obviously, such a compiler could also insert malicious code into WRA load 
images as they are being generated. 
4. Injected Malicious Code 
Injected malicious code exploits a vulnerability in the WRA software to add the 
malicious code at run-time.  Therefore, the issues associated this type and the mitigations 
recommended are the same as for the vulnerability threats discussed previously. 
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IV. MITIGATION APPROACHES 
This chapter examines existing methods of mitigating the risks of embedded 
malicious code that are based on specific approaches for locating such code in individual 
system components.  The main problem with simply looking for malicious code is that 
we cannot be sure we’ve found it all.  Thus, we cannot make any statements about 
whether the software is safe, or the degree to which we believe it to be safe. 
As these existing approaches prove inadequate to the problem, alternate system 
engineering approaches are proposed that utilize knowledge of the system (and the 
problem) as a whole to provide workable solutions in many cases.   
A. TRADITIONAL DETECTION METHODS 
From a software view (as opposed to a systems view), there are two main ways to 
detect malicious code.  We can examine the source code and try to locate the malicious 
code, or we can execute the binary (compiled code) and try to detect anomalous behavior.  
Examination of the source code is referred to as static analysis and can be done by hand 
or with the aid of special software called static analysis tools.  (“Static program analysis,” 
n.d.)  Detection during run-time is referred to as dynamic analysis (“Dynamic program 
analysis,” n.d.). 
1. Detection Using Static Analysis Tools 
A static analysis tool is a software program that reads and automatically analyzes 
the source code for a program and tries to identify potential coding errors and 
vulnerabilities.  Note that covert malicious code, if detected at all, will be identified as a 
programming error.  Overt malicious code will not be detected at all—unless it happens 
to contain a potential coding error—because the tool cannot know what behavior is 
considered malicious. 
The static analysis tool works by trying to identify potential programming errors 
and rule (e.g., coding convention) violations.  For our purposes, one useful feature of a 
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static analysis tool is its ability to identify some locations in the source code where 
memory might be accessed incorrectly.  This might be as the result of an error at a single 
point in the program, or as the result of multiple parts of the program accessing the same 
memory in different ways.  This type of analysis is called a “pointer” or “points-to” 
analysis.  Due to the way memory references are handled in software, in some cases it is 
not always possible to determine whether two variables refer to the same memory 
location.  Thus the analysis tool has the choice of identifying all possible places where 
this might happen, or assuming that the potential cases are correctly coded (Livshits, 
2006). 
Zitser, Lippman, and Leek (2004) analyzed the performance of five static analysis 
tools by having them try to detect known buffer overflow problems in open source 
software.  The tools were run on both the original (containing the known error) and 
patched (the error was no longer present) versions of the software.  For three of the tools, 
detection was very poor, for the remaining two tools, detection rates were 57% and 87%.  
While this initially appears useful, the two tools with the high detection rate also had a 
very high false alarm rate.  The tools produced one false alarm for every 12 to 46 lines of 
source code and were unable to distinguish between safe patched code and unsafe 
vulnerable code. 
As previously mentioned, it is difficult for even an experienced programmer to 
examine source code to locate potential errors.  Thus even when a static analysis tool 
flags potential problems with the software, it is not at all clear that a programmer will be 
able to detect the issue (if there is one).  If the tool only generated one potential issue for 
every thirty-five (35) lines of source code, a one million Source Lines Of Code (SLOC) 
program would require an analysis of over 28,000 potential cases. 
According to Charette (2009), a premium car in 1990 required approximately 100 
million lines SLOC, which would translate into 2.8 million cases to examine—surely a 
daunting and impractical approach. 
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Malicious code can also utilize techniques that do not involve either programming 
errors or vulnerabilities.  Although trivial types of vulnerabilities that might be employed 
were discussed, it is important to realize that the analysis tools are not able to flag all 
potential vulnerabilities as they rely on looking for specific programming constructs.  
Thus malicious code may be written that can bypass the detection capability of the tools.  
Further, malicious code is not limited to vulnerabilities to cause damage.  As a trivial 
example, consider software that writes to specific register addresses in the hardware the 
software is hosted on.  These registers control things such as the stack pointer (used to 
retrieve the return address for subroutines as well as the contents of variables—including 
pointers) and interrupt routines.   Writing a value to a register does not necessarily result 
in a vulnerability (even when it enables malicious behavior).  Since the hardware is 
outside the capability of a static analysis tool, the tool cannot analyze these accesses.  
Clean code may also be implemented from a malicious design. 
Even when both the design and implementation is logically correct, the executable 
code will need to operate on some underlying system (e.g., hardware, software emulator).  
It is a common misconception that the software operates independently of the underlying 
environment, however this is not true.  The influence of the hardware on the software can 
be extremely subtle.  For example, consider the two pseudo-code fragments in Figure 16.  
The only difference is whether we access the array in column order or row order, so it 
may appear that it does not make a difference.  However, it turns out that one method will 
be significantly faster if we are using Dynamic Random Address Memory (DRAM) on 
the underlying hardware.  This is because of the way the physical memory is accessed.  A 
DRAM Integrated Circuit (IC) is implemented as a matrix and is accessed by placing the 
upper half (row address) of the full memory address on DRAM IC’s (smaller) address 
lines and pulsing the Row Address Strobe (RAS) line.  Then the lower half of the full 
address (column address) is placed on the DRAM IC’s address lines and the Column 
Address Strobe (CAS) line is pulsed.  This causes the byte at that address in the DRAM 
IC to appear.  However, the DRAM IC’s have a feature that allows you to simply pulse 
the CAS line again to obtain the next sequential byte.  If you access memory in column 
address order, the hardware will automatically use this capability.  If you instead access 
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in row order, the hardware will need to transfer the address to the DRAM IC each time.  
In practice, this means that someone who is familiar with this can subtly affect the timing 
of the software. 
FOR I=1 .. 50
BEGIN





FOR I=1 .. 50
BEGIN
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Figure 16 - Non-Obvious Hardware Dependency 
Even when the code is clean, it can be made to fail by taking advantage of 
configuration parameters related to how the software will interact with specific hardware.  
These parameters are outside of the actual software but can cause failures for non-
obvious reasons.  Consider the pseudo-code in Figure 17.  Both examples will work fine 
under most circumstances.  However, the routine on the left will use more stack resources 
because it has more local variables.  If there is not enough stack space allocated to the 
program, calling the subroutine will actually result in a stack overflow.  On some 
platforms, this will cause a program crash, on others it will fail silently.  Depending on 
the language and compiler, an attacker may be able to control what is overwritten and 


















Less Stack Usage  
Figure 17 - Subtle Difference in Stack Usage 
Note that the amount of stack space required by a program is often an estimate.  
Although it is often possible to determine what subroutines call each other and in what 
order, certain programming techniques such as recursion and trampoline code make this 
task impossible at compile time (and thus not detectable by static analysis).  As a result, 
many systems have a default stack size.  Under UNIX®, a user can change the amount of 
stack space allocated to a program.  Under Windows®, a developer can tell the compiler 
how much stack space will be required (the value is embedded in the executable).  Note 
that in both cases, the stack size (and thus whether an overflow will occur) is outside of 
the actual source code. 
Static analysis tools process source files written in specific languages.  There are 
literally thousands of computer languages (“Lists of programming languages,” n.d.).  
Thus it is entirely possible that the WRA potentially containing malicious code is written 
in a language that is not supported by any static analysis tool.  Keep in mind that it is 
possible to embed one language (typically assembly language) into source code written in 
a different language, so even if the primary language is supported, the embedded 
language(s) may not be. 
Ballard, Chou, Chuang, Doshi, & Kimball (2004) describe two software tools that 
insert malicious code and vulnerabilities into software programs.  These tools are 
specifically written such that specific static analysis tools will be unable to detect the 
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inserted malicious code and vulnerabilities.  Note that a programmer need not be 
particularly skilled to use these tools.  Thus it is possible for an attacker to simply write 
straightforward overt malicious code and then use the tool to hide it in the software.  The 
tools even make the inserted errors look like careless programming errors to allow for 
plausible deniability. 
Another potential issue is the unavailability of source code.  Many applications 
are built using third party libraries and operating systems.  The source code for these may 
not be available at any price due to trade secret concerns.  Part of the source code cannot 
be scanned in these cases.  This has implications not just for the possibility of 
vulnerabilities and malicious code in the libraries, but will also prevent a static analyzer 
from tracing potential problems through function/procedure calls that are part of the 
library. 
 Based on the above, static analysis is of partial, but limited usefulness in the 
detection of malicious code.  Figure 18 shows the static analysis situation (note that the 
circles in the Venn diagram are not to scale). 
Vulnerabilities 
that a static 
analysis tool
can catch
Total set of 
possible 
vulnerabilities 
in the code Total set of 
possible Covert 
Malicious Code
Malicious code that a 
static analysis tool 
can catch
Total set of 
possible  Overt 
Malicious Code
Malicious code that 
depends on a 
vulnerability
Note: Circles are not 
to scale  
Figure 18 - Static Analysis vs. Malicious Code 
 As mentioned before, overt malicious code does not depend on any 
erroneous behavior so it will not be detected by an automatic tool (although manual 
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inspection would presumably catch some cases).  Further, a static analysis tool is only 
going to catch a subset of the total vulnerabilities in the software.  This is obvious not 
only from the literature but the simple fact that the news (2011) is full of examples of 
hackers exploiting vulnerabilities in code.  If a tool was able to prevent this, these cases 
would not occur.  Covert malicious code uses numerous techniques, and only some of 
them are based on vulnerabilities.  Finally, since tools exist that insert vulnerabilities into 
software which these tools cannot detect, it should be clear that the tools cannot detect all 
vulnerability based malicious code.  Note that although the case is not shown on the 
diagram, if the code is written in a language that is not supported by the tool, then 
nothing can be detected with the tool. 
2. Detection Using Dynamic Analysis 
  Another approach is to use some form of dynamic analysis.  Dynamic 
analysis consists of executing the compiled program on a real or virtual processor 
(“Dynamic program analysis,” n.d.). 
As mentioned earlier, some software development methodologies, especially for 
embedded airborne software, include some type of code coverage analysis.  This is a 
form of dynamic analysis in that it works by instrumenting (adding little code snippets) to 
the source code to allow someone to tell what parts of the program have actually been 
executed.  Although it may be impossible to fully evaluate the code (due to issues such as 
multiple languages and hardware limitations), by providing assurance that all of the 
available source code has been executed we can be reasonably sure that there is no 
obvious overt malicious code present (in the code we were actually able to instrument).  
Note that there are levels of code coverage analysis.  Figure 19 illustrates a code snippet 
with the code “blocks” and branch statement identified.  On the simpler end of the 
spectrum, we verify that each code “block” has been executed during testing.  More 
complicated methods require that branching constructs (e.g., “if” statements) be fully 














Figure 19 - Code Coverage Analysis 
It is also possible to detect many types of covert malicious code using other 
source code modification techniques.  For example, the ProPolice homepage provides a 
“GCC extension for protecting applications from stack-smashing attacks” 
(http://www.research.ibm.com/trl/projects/security/ssp/).  The GCC compiler extension 
works by adding “canaries” to the stack around buffers and other key parameters.  For 
example, when a return address is placed on the stack, it is surrounded with specific 
values.  Before using the return address to return to the calling routine, the canaries are 
checked to make sure they have not been altered.  Thus a simple buffer overflow attack 
would be detected as the canaries surrounding the buffer would be modified by the 
attack.  This adds a very slight amount of overhead to each function call. 
Although the canary technique seems quite powerful, it is not adequate to stop a 
determined attacker.  Bulba & Kil3r  (2000) describe a simple method to bypass canary 
protection techniques and allow buffer overflow attacks.  They attack the stack indirectly 
through other variables. 
Many types of dynamic analysis detection methods involve changing the 
underlying environment.  This is because in order to be successful, malicious code 
depends on the underlying environment to operate “correctly.”  Examples of changes that 
may result in detecting the malicious code include: 
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• Change the opcodes used by the CPU – for example, if the malicious 
code consists of executable instructions hidden as data in the data 
segment of the program, when the opcodes change, the “executable” 
instructions will become meaningless garbage.  This will generally 
result in a program crash. 
• Changes to the stack layout – for example, if the malicious code 
overwrites a subroutine return address in the original stack layout, in 
the modified layout some other value will be overwritten.  This may 
cause a crash, it may cause the program to run incorrectly (presumably 
detected during testing), or it may do no harm (e.g., if the value 
overwritten is not used again). 
• Changes to the memory layout – for example, if the malicious code 
tries to transfer the execution thread to a specific location in memory 
(where other malicious code is hidden), changes to the memory layout 
will result in a transfer of control to a random location in the program 
resulting in a crash or odd program behavior.  There is a small chance 
that the location will immediately return and the program will run 
normally. 
As an example of how changing the underlying execution environment can detect 
malicious code, consider the attack shown in Figure 20.  The attacker has placed 
malicious code on the stack (in the form of data) with an expectation that it will be at a 
specific location in memory.  The attacker has also included a hidden jump to this 
location.  In order for the attack to work, the malicious code must be where the attacker 
thinks he put it.  By randomly choosing the start of the stack frame (or making other 
changes such as the direction of stack expansion), the attacker is unable to use a fixed 
offset.  If he did use a fixed offset and the offset is now changed the, the program will 
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Figure 20 - Affect of Randomizing Stack Location/Characteristics 
 Note that certain classes of subtle programming errors may also be detected with 
this approach.  For example, if a programmer allocated dynamic memory on the heap, 
and then uses it after it has been freed, the program might appear to operate normally 
(depending on what happened to be in memory at that location).  By moving the heap 
location, the program might fail because different bad values may be referenced.  Of 
course, malicious source code may be disguised as a programming error for deniability so 
we cannot tell if the error was malicious. 
 Not all covert malicious source code attacks rely on hard-coded addresses.  
Attacks that are “portable” may survive different environments.  These attacks are harder 
to write because they need to use references (e.g., variables) to calculate the required 
offset.  In other cases, an attacker might need to know the relative offsets between two 
buffers.  For example, an attacker might choose to add a covert channel to an encrypted 
data stream, deliberately leaking the decryption key by embedding it into “random” noise 
used to pad out the encrypted message.  Simply moving the start of the stack would not 
affect this attack if the buffers were in the same compilation unit.  This case is not 
addressed in detail although other randomization techniques can be used in this case. 
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Both attacks involving malicious code injection (where an attacker utilizes an 
input channel and a vulnerability to “inject” malicious code into the program) and covert 
malicious code that uses pre-compiled malicious code rely on the knowledge of what 
opcode (bit pattern in memory) causes which behavior.  For example, if 0x1234 means 
add register A and register B and we suddenly redefined 0x1234 to mean subtract register 
A from register B  (and perhaps redefined 0x2134 to mean add register A and B), any 
program compiled using the old set of rules would fail to run.  Thus if we randomize the 
opcodes (i.e., redefine what each bit pattern in memory means), any pre-compiled 
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Figure 21 - Effect of Changing Opcode Definitions 
Embedded airborne software is not able to utilize many dynamic techniques such 
as these in the final production version of the software.  This is because detection of an 
accidental problem (e.g., not malicious software but instead a coding error) during 
operational use might be worse than the response to the detected problem.  For example, 
in the case of a canary, if a buffer overflow was detected, the result would be a software 
crash.  If this was an accidental problem (or even an incorrectly implemented malicious 
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attack), the software might continue to run normally despite the problem.  The same logic 
applies to modifying the software’s environment, although here the problem “detection” 
would most likely result in a crash.  In a safety critical WRA, a software crash might be 
catastrophic.  Thus techniques that involve a virtual environment may be unacceptable 
for operational usage due not only to unacceptable performance loss but also safety 
concerns.  Safety issues are also involved if we were to change the opcodes used.  
Nonetheless, porting the software from one platform to another can both effectively 
change the opcodes and also affect other execution environment factors.   
The Systems Engineer must weigh the damage caused by detecting an accidental 
programming error when the system is in use against the possibility of detecting 
malicious code.  In general, the risks posed by dynamically altering the execution 
environment are unacceptable.  Most programs contain numerous errors but may contain 
no malicious code.  Thus for safety critical software we will tend to be more concerned 
with accidental software errors than malicious code. 
In order to minimize the likelihood of exposing a programming error when the 
WRA is in use, safety critical applications tend to minimize any dynamic characteristics 
of the execution environment.  Dynamic memory allocation may be prohibited, process 
execution order may be fixed, etc … As a result, we are providing the attacker an ideal 
environment for malicious code. 
Many of the techniques involving changing the run-time environment may only 
be used under controlled conditions (when the WRA may fail without serious 
consequences), although there are exceptions.  Techniques such as using Write 
Exclusive-Or Execute (W^X) memory pages should never cause an issue for legitimate 
safety critical software since they would indicate that the software had already failed in a 
very serious way.  Most other techniques require making a change, testing the code under 
the change, and then changing back to the original. 
One simple method of partially randomizing the run-time environment is to re-
compile the software with a different compiler.  This may result in changes to the stack 
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and heap layout as well as resulting in size changes (e.g., due to optimization differences) 
throughout the code and changing CPU register usage. 
How effective is simply using a different compiler?  Sun Microsystems chose to 
support multiple compilers on their OpenSolaris platform, in part to allow for the 
execution environment changes to detect programming errors.  Wesolowski (2006) writes 
“These 28 bugs are tangible evidence of code quality improvement demanded by the use 
of multiple compilers; many of these defects would be expected to affect customers.  
Note that these defects still existed even after most common kernel and library code was 
fixed by the amd64 team, so the actual number of bugs was likely much higher..” 
If it is feasible to port the software to another hardware platform, this is even 
more effective (especially with a different compiler).  The stack and heap may be 
arranged differently, the wordsize may be different, the system libraries will be different, 
the instruction set will be different, etc.  Each of these changes makes it less likely that 
any embedded malicious code will still operate “properly.” 
A complete port to new hardware is seldom feasible because the embedded 
systems often depend on special hardware and interfaces.  Even so, porting of CSCs 
combined with unit testing can provide much of the benefit of a complete port for those 
portions of the code.  Some of the benefits of porting may be obtained by simple 
modifications of the code base.  Although this does not change the instruction set 
(opcodes) and uses the same libraries, we can alter the layout and position of the stack 
and heap as well as re-order the layout of code blocks within the text segment and data 
blocks within the data and BSS segments. 
One simple technique is to change the order that object files are linked together.  
This is shown in Figure 22.  Any covert malicious code that depends on absolute 
addresses or that depends on a fixed distance between locations in different source files 
will break.  Note that in this example, the first object file was not moved because often 
the program entry point must be in the first object file.  Similarly, the library files, 
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although re-ordered, still follow the object files because many linkers require this.  Thus 














Figure 22 - Link Order Randomization 
Covert malicious code might also depend on the relative spacing between 
procedures or the data associated with them within the same source (and object) file.  
Figure 23 shows a simple method to impact this.  Note that this is labor intensive and 
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Figure 23 - Randomize Code Order 
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Similar techniques can be used to randomize Data and BSS segment contents.  It 
is also possible to add extra dummy arrays with randomly determined sizes.  This last 
approach can be done in an automated way as part of the toolchain. 
Keep in mind that most of the detected issues will be a result of a programming 
error and that the program may be able to operate normally despite the error.  In some 
cases, this failure mode (assuming it is the result of an accidental programming error) 
may be preferable in actual use to a complete program failure.  As a result, when these 
techniques are used it is necessary to make the modifications to the code, compile and 
test the code, then remove the modifications and re-compile and re-test.  This concept is 
embodied in the NASA principle “test what you fly, fly what you test.”  It would be 
possible to use some of these techniques (e.g., the canary approach) and have detected 
errors reported to a Built In Test (BIT) system rather than crash but I have not seen this 
approach implemented. 
Unfortunately, none of the techniques presented here can guarantee that no 
malicious code remains in the source code – or toolchain for that matter.  Figure 24 
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Figure 24 - Dynamic Analysis vs Malicious Code 
B. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING MITIGATION APPROACH 
A Systems Engineer works on a problem as a whole, rather than being limited to 
techniques that apply to a single WRA.  Although a Software Engineer may have insight 
into these approaches, it is unlikely that they will be able to control the selection of all the 
WRAs used or the information flow between them to the level available to a Systems 
Engineer.  In addition, the Systems Engineer can control system level testing – typically 
not an option for a Software Engineer.  This section uses this holistic view as the basis for 
an alternate approach to the problem of malicious code. 
It is assumed that the attacker wants the malicious code to cause a problem in an 
airborne system after it is put into service.  If the malicious code is detected during 
testing, it will be extremely limited in the amount of damage it can cause.  Thus the 
challenge for the attacker is to insert malicious code in such a way that it will pass testing 
but fail later during use. 
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It is further assumed that the goal is to have the system operate safely, whether or 
not it actually contains malicious code.  As such, the goal is not to make sure that there is 
no malicious code present, but instead to be able to say that if there is malicious code 
present it cannot cause harm. 
1. Attacker Requirements 
What does an attacker need in order to insert malicious code into the software?  It 
depends on whether they want to attack the source code or the binary load image. 
For overt malicious source code, they only need basic programming skills and 
access to the source code.  For covert malicious source code, they need a higher level of 
programming skill (or a tool that will insert the code for them), knowledge of the specific 
system environment, and access to the source code.  
For a malicious load image, they need the ability to build a malicious load image.  
Thus they need basic programming skills, access to the source code, and the compilation 
toolchain necessary to build the image.  Alternatively, they need an existing binary, 
compilation tools, and enough knowledge of the binary that they can patch it to link in 
the malicious code.  They also need the ability to replace the clean load image with the 
malicious load image.  For example: access to the CM system; access to a load device; or 
access to the WRA after programming. 
In the above cases, it is assumed that the software will be tested (a solid 
assumption for the case of safety critical embedded airborne software), thus the attacker 
needs a way to have the software operate normally during test yet fail later 
For injected malicious code, the attacker needs a higher skill level than basic 
programming knowledge, as well as knowledge of the specific system environment, and 
knowledge of the vulnerability.  If they have access to a hacking tool for the system they 
are trying to attack, then only basic programming skills and knowledge of the 
vulnerability are required.  Depending on when the code will be injected, it may be 
necessary for the injected malicious code to know when to act maliciously. 
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2. Trigger Concept 
 As discussed earlier, in order to do something malicious, the execution thread 
must pass through a section of malicious code that determines whether to actually behave 
maliciously or not.  Figure 25 shows this as an “if” statement (although the 
implementation of the “if” will not be explicit in the case of covert malicious code).  This 
“if” statement is executed each time the WRA operates—otherwise, the malicious code 
would be unable to do any harm. 
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Figure 25 - Trigger Concept 
 The “if” statement must evaluate some condition in order to determine if the 
malicious behavior should occur, otherwise the malicious behavior would always 
occur—including during testing.  This condition is referred to as a “Trigger Condition” in 
this thesis because it is used by an attacker to “pull the trigger.”  For example, a trigger 
condition might be related to usage hours.  If the WRA has been operated over 200 hours, 
then cause a problem.  The trigger condition might be related to an altitude.  If the A/C 
exceeds 10,000 ft, then cause a problem. 
 Thus in order to cause a problem, the trigger condition must be met.  The trigger 
condition will be based on some input condition.  In the above example, the software 
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cannot trigger based on the usage hours unless it has a way to determine those hours.  In 
the case of an altitude based trigger, unless the software has a way to determine the 
altitude it cannot use this as a trigger. 
 A Systems Engineer can often control what information is available to a WRA 
(and thus the software embedded in the WRA).  For example, if a WRA does not need to 
know the altitude, there is no reason to provide it this information.  The information 
available to a WRA can be evaluated to determine if any of it is useful as a trigger.  If no 
trigger information is available, then a reasonable amount of testing can ensure that the 
WRA does not contain malicious code.  If there are pieces of information that can be 
used as a trigger, but the WRA does not require them to be used in the particular system 
being developed, a Systems Engineer can prevent those pieces of information from 
reaching the WRA.  In this case, a reasonable amount of testing can ensure that either 
there is no malicious code present or, if there is malicious code present, that it will never 
be triggered (and will thus not do harm)4.   
 In the case of an internal usage counter, the Systems Engineer will probably not 
be able to prevent this input from being used as a trigger as the counter is likely to be 
stored in some section of Non-Volatile Memory (NVM).  However, if the System 
Engineer were to test the WRA for (say) 200 hrs and then reset the usage counter every 
(say) 100 hrs, any trigger based on the usage hours would be blocked.  Thus a certain 
amount of testing would allow us to conclude that either the WRA contained no 
malicious code or that the code was based on a trigger value that required a value greater 
than the amount of testing hours to cause the malicious behavior. 
 Note that it is also possible for an attacker to trigger based on some statistical 
occurrence.  If a source of random information is available, an algorithm could be 
devised that would cause malicious behavior very rarely.  By doing some statistical 
analysis, an attacker could estimate the mean time to trigger and adjust it appropriately.  
                                                 
4 Note that this is not completely true as a statistical trigger could be used.  This is discussed later. 
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This is not a particularly attractive approach for the attacker as there are two undesirable 
outcomes: the behavior might occur during testing; or the behavior might never occur.   
Statistical triggers can be partially mitigated by increasing the testing time in 
order to reduce the probability that an undiscovered trigger is present.  For example, if 
the expected lifetime usage of a WRA is 100 hrs, and it is tested for 10 hrs, the odds of 
detection would be low (but not zero) that a hidden problem would be detected.  If it is  
tested only 50 hrs, the odds of detection would still be low (but higher than before). 
3. Information Limiting Concept 
A Systems Engineer needs to evaluate all the information available to a WRA in 
order to assess potential trigger information.  This involves examining all potentially 
available information, not just information that the WRA requires to operate.  For 
example, many airborne avionics systems use ARINC429 to communicate.  ARINC429 
is a two wire bus system that allows one transmitter and up to twenty receivers (AIM, 
2010). 
A WRA receiving information through an ARINC429 bus may only need a 
fraction of the information available on the bus.  However, the WRA has access to all 
information on the bus and could use any information from the bus as a trigger. 
A Systems Engineer can control what information is available to WRAs by 
controlling what busses the WRA is connected to.  Since some WRAs may transmit 
information that is not needed (because they are general purpose and do not know what 
receivers will be using it), it may be possible to modify these WRAs to eliminate the 
potentially risky information from the bus. 
4. Safety Assessment 
Not all WRAs can cause the same degree of damage if they fail.  WRAs on 
airborne systems are commonly categorized by the danger posed by a failure.  For 
example, DO-178B assigns Design Assurance Level (DAL) values of A-E to WRAs 
based on a safety assessment.  Since a Level D WRA only has a potential impact of 
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“Minor” and a Level E WRA only has a potential impact of “No Effect,” it may not be 
necessary to worry about the possibility of malicious code in these units.  Keep in mind, 
however, that these levels are only related to safety issues.  The failure of a Level E 
WRA could result in a mission failure or compromise of classified/sensitive information.  
The DAL values can be used as a starting point and then augmented as necessary. 
5. Testing Considerations 
Software in airborne avionics systems is typically thoroughly tested, however 
these tests are designed to locate unintentional problems in the software.  Testing is 
typically performed on the WRAs themselves, then subsystems, then the entire aircraft.  
In order to mitigate the risk of malicious code, it is necessary to augment these tests  
based on the system risk posed by each WRA and the triggers available to each WRA. 
The actual choice of what augmentation (if any) will be required is a function of 
the potential triggers identified.  For example, if usage hours is the only available trigger, 
then we might require that the number of testing hours exceeds the amount that will be 
incurred during normal usage. 
  In practice it may not be cost effective to mitigate a potential trigger since it is 
generally not adequate to simply test each possible value of the potential trigger 
condition.  For example, assume the attacker is using altitude information as a trigger.  
The attacker is unlikely to trigger when the altitude exceeds or equals a specific value as 
this is likely to be caught in testing.  They might, however consider triggering after an 
altitude is exceeded for a specific amount of time, or after it is crossed a certain number 
of times, or on a specific combination.  Keep in mind that the attacker will need to 
identify a scenario that will not occur during test yet will occur in use.  Thus, as a general 
rule, if access to trigger information cannot be blocked, testing will be adequacy cannot 
be guaranteed.  
If a WRA is available that has been used successfully in the past, this usage can 
be leveraged as additional assurance that the WRA contains no malicious code—since it 
is unlikely that a WRA that has not been triggered during use elsewhere will cause a 
 58 
problem for our effort.  Note however that the environment in which the WRA was used 
needs to be similar.  For example, if the WRA has an input that was not used in the past, 
which is planned to be used in the new application, it cannot be assumed that no 
malicious code is present – since the malicious code might trigger based on the 
previously unused input.  Assuming the environment was similar, there is a need to verify 
that the source code, which was used successfully in the past, is the same source code that 
will be used as the starting point for the new effort.  I present a method to accomplish this 
in Chapter VI. (p. 74).  Any required changes can then be made and our effort is limited 
to the risk imposed by the new code only. 
C. MITIGATION RECOMMENDATIONS 
Based on the previous analysis, this section provides guidelines that can be used 
as a framework to mitigate the risk of malicious code in a WRA.  Start by bounding the 
potential risks posed by each WRA by categorizing it.  Specifically, categorize each 
WRA based on: 
• How much risk it represents (can use DAL values as a starting point) 
• Whether it has an external interface 
• What potential trigger information is available 




Characteristics Observation Actions 
Low Risk If WRA contains malicious 
code, damage is limited 
No action necessary (assuming 
willingness to assume the risk) 
No Potential Trigger 
Information 
Could use a statistical trigger  Specify amount of testing to 
reduce risk to acceptable level 
Potential Trigger 
Information 
Significant risk Determine if trigger information 
can be eliminated; examine WRA 
components to see if risk can be 
isolated to a subset of the WRA 
External Interface Risk depends on input 
channel specifics 
Determine potential for triggers; 
determine potential for 
vulnerability based attacks 
Internal Interfaces 
Only 
Low risk of vulnerability 
(another WRA must be 
compromised first) 
Take action based on other 
characteristics  
Table 1.   Table 1 - Potential Mitigation Approaches Based on WRA Characteristics 
 
Based on Table 1, we can see that the primary challenges for mitigating malicious 
code are WRAs that both have high risk and also have either external interfaces (because 
they are potentially vulnerable to an attacker) or have triggers available (because they 
may contain trigger-able malicious code).  In each case, we can sub-divide the problem 
further. 
1. WRAs with External Interfaces 
In order to deal with WRAs that have external interfaces, we can categorize the 
types of input to determine both the potential for taking advantage of vulnerabilities and 
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also for use as a potential trigger.  For the case of airborne avionics, many of the external 
interfaces only represent a voltage level.  For example, a temperature sensor, or an 
airspeed indicator may output a voltage depending on the current value.  The WRA may 
use this value directly or may simply send it (via an internal interface) to another WRA in 
the system. 
Potential approaches for various types of external inputs are listed in Table 2. 
 
External Input Type Observation Actions 
Analog Level (e.g. engine 
temperature, not encoded 
data) 
Very low vulnerability risk, 
potential trigger 
Handle based on trigger 
information 
Specific Message Format 
(irrespective of carrier, i.e., 
analog carrier of data is not 
an analog level) 
If we already read (say) six 
bytes, vulnerability risk is 
low.  If we read two bytes 
that then tell us how many 
bytes to read, vulnerability 
risk is high.  Potential 
Trigger. 
Determine potential for 
abuse of message format by 
examining message layout, 
treat as freeform if potential 
exists; take steps to mitigate 
trigger risk  
Freeform Message Format 
(including Ethernet 
connections) 
Risk of vulnerability, 
potential trigger 
Take steps to expose 
vulnerabilities and potential 
malicious code, examine 
WRA components to see if 
risk can be isolated to a 
subset of the WRA 
Table 2.   Table 2 - Potential Mitigation Steps for WRAs with External Interfaces 
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For WRAs that have external inputs likely to pose a problem, it is necessary to 
roll off to static and dynamic analysis methods and accept the residual risk.  Dynamic 
techniques are recommended when possible.  The degree of testing would be determined 
by the potential risk posed by that particular WRA.  Note that in some cases, only part of 
the WRA must be tested as the WRA can sometimes be decomposed into WRA 
components and our efforts can be targets to components with external connections. 
2. WRAs with access to Trigger Information 
Some WRAs have access to information that can be used as trigger information 
and we cannot block this information from the WRA, either because it is impractical to 
do so or because the WRA needs the information to operate.  If a WRA represents a 
significant risk and has trigger information available we will need to determine what 
portions of the WRA represent a risk and then take steps to identify potential malicious 
code.  Since trigger information cannot be blocked, I recommend using static and 
dynamic analysis techniques for these WRAs.   
 For the case of Overt Malicious Code, we can gain significant benefit from the 
use of structure coverage testing as required by DO-178B.  Figure 26 shows the situation 
for Overt malicious code.  Note that DO-178B cannot completely eliminate this risk 
because some parts of the source code will not be tested.  Level C WRAs will only be 
tested with statement coverage – allowing for malicious behavior in the decision tests 
themselves.  Even Level A WRAs with MC/DC testing cannot cover all cases since not 
all possible program states are represented.  Static analysis testing is shown on this 
diagram because there is significant overlap between static analysis testing and DO-178B 
testing.   
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Figure 26 - Leveraging DO-178B Testing for Overt Malicious Code 
For the case of Covert malicious code, some set of dynamic testing is 
recommended.  Figure 27 shows the situation for both Overt and Covert malicious code 
and the effect of changing one or more factors in the underlying execution environment.  
In some cases we will already be planning to make changes that will affect the execution 
environment.  For example, during the development process we may plan to move 
software between partitions to balance the system load.  We might plan on shrinking the 
stack size late in the development process once we know how much memory will be 
required.  We might already plan to implement some safer run-time detection methods 
such as using a Memory Management Unit (MMU) to limit access to memory segments. 
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Figure 27 - Changing the Execution Environment 
Unfortunately, there is insufficient information to set the relative size of the 
circles so we cannot determine the remaining risk that there is malicious code present. 
Note however that the risk posed by the specific WRA within the overall system can be 
determined.  The WRA has a limited ability to cause harm at the system level.  Similarly, 
we can sometimes bound the risk within the WRA. 
The problem can be approached by examining the architecture of the WRA to 
identify both the physical structure of the WRA (different CPUs and memory spaces) and 
the individual CSCIs have access to the trigger information.  In many cases, there may 
only be a small subset of the software in the WRA that poses a risk.  Obviously it is an 
advantage to identify this situation if it exists.  In terms of physical sub-assemblies, each 
assembly can be treated as if it were a WRA.  Depending on the internal topology of the 
WRA, the maximum risk posed by the WRA may be further reduced.  For example, if the 
trigger information is only used by a small subset of the WRA that does not interfere with 
the more critical functions provided by the WRA, the risk posed may be low. 
Since software within a WRA (or WRA sub-assembly) may contain multiple 
CSCIs, it may prove useful to examine the pedigree of each CSCI.  If, for example, it is 
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discovered that only one CSCI is involved and it has been widely used in the past, it may 
be possible to eliminate this as a risk (although there would be a need to verify that the 
CSCI source code is in fact what has been safely used in the past).  I present a method of 
doing this verification in Chapter VI. (p. 74).  
If the remaining risk posed by software in the WRA (or WRA sub-assembly) is 
unacceptable, I recommend using statement coverage (execute every line) to eliminate 
overt risks and various types of execution environment randomization to increase the 
probability of malicious code detection. 
In the case of DO-178B level C and above WRAs, we will obtain the statement 
coverage testing for free.  When this is not the case, the same techniques would be used 
even though they would not be required from a System Safety standpoint. 
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V. TRUSTED SOFTWARE CUSTODY CHAIN 
When software is initially developed, it may contain malicious source code.  
However, even if the original source code is clean, there exists the possibility that 
malicious code will be added later.  This chapter traces the source code from 
development to its final use in an attempt to identify and mitigate the risks of this 
occurring throughout the development process. 
A. BASIC DEVELOPMENT PROCESS MODEL 
The generic software development life cycle for embedded avionics systems 
shown below is used as the basis to discuss the potential for inclusion of malicious code 
during software development and deployment: 
• The source code is developed 
• The source code is placed under CM control 
• Source code is pulled from CM control for build 
• Source code is compiled, assembled, linked, etc ... into a load image 
• The load image is loaded into firmware by the OEM, or  
• The load image is delivered to the customer/user 
• The load image or hardware with loaded firmware is transferred to customer 
 control 
• The customer/user maintains control of the software 
 Note that the design effort that would typically proceed the development of the 
software has been deliberately excluded as a malicious system/subsystem design is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  Also note that the software development process 
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assumes the use of a Configuration Management (CM) system.  Many design 
methodologies (including DO-178B) expect this basic level of process control to be in 
place. 
B. THREATS 
Each stage of the development process contains opportunities for an attacker to 
insert malicious code.  Thus even if we trust the software developer completely, the 
source code may still be at risk.  Multiple places where the WRA may be compromised 
during the software development and delivery process are identified below.  Each threat 
is detailed along with specific mitigation recommendations. 
1. Source Code Development 
This threat consists of a programmer deliberately writing malicious code that can 
pass various types of screening used by an organization using good engineering practices 
—such as we expect would be used to develop embedded avionics software.  Such 
organizations typically employ techniques such as peer code reviews, code analysis tools, 
unit testing, and integration testing.  Code compromised in this way must be able to pass 
such screens. 
Since it is assumed that the code must pass code review, the programmer will 
need to embed a subtle bug in the program that will cause the program is misbehave.  I.e., 
it is not likely that code can be inserted that explicitly causes the failure. 
Since the software will be tested, the corrupt code must not fail under normal 
conditions or have the failure detected.  This means that code that contains a “payload” 
must have a “trigger” that causes the software to fail.  Such code is sometimes referred to 
as a “logic bomb.”  Other failures are not obvious, and might always be present but not 
noticed.  For example, in some cryptography algorithms, noise is added to the signal 
during the encryption process.  When the signal is decoded, the noise is removed and 
discarded.  If covert malicious code added the decryption key to the noise in the 
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encryption algorithm, it is not likely that this would be noticed—and the algorithm 
operate correctly; yet an attacker could read all the encrypted traffic. 
Unfortunately, if trigger information is available (or, as in the cryptography 
example, the code can act maliciously all the time without detection), blocking trigger 
information is not a viable approach.  Instead, a combination of static and dynamic 
analysis may be used.  Since many individual Computer Software Components (CSCs) 
can be tested independently of the entire application, it may not be particularly expensive 
to port both the CSC containing the problematic source code and the testing framework to 
other environments and use other dynamic techniques while unit testing.  Unit testing can 
be done by a separate test group to maintain independence.  Combined with formal code 
walkthroughs and control of the CM system, this will reduce the risk – although the 
actual remaining residual risk will not be known. 
2. Source File Replaced (e.g., Pre-CM System Check-In) 
This threat consists of replacing code that has been inspected and unit tested prior 
to its insertion into the CM system.  It can be carried out by anyone with access to the 
code or filesystem.  This includes the programmer, anyone on the programming team 
(assuming that a shared work area is used), or system administrators. 
An inexpensive way to mitigate this threat is to setup the development process so 
that the software is checked into the CM system prior to code inspection.  The code 
inspection should be done on copies of the software obtained from the CM system. 
3. Configuration System (CM) System Compromised 
This threat consists of replacing/altering code that is under CM control without 
leaving a record of this change.  This is a trivial task for many CM systems.  Files stored 
under CM are often stored as a parent file (original version or current version) and then a 
series of differences that can be used to re-construct specific versions of the file.  Under 
many CM systems, all the differences are stored as simple text files that can be read or 
modified by anyone with access to the filesystem where they are stored.  This includes 
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the CM administrators and system administrators.  Often programmers and even users 
have access as well.  Certain CM systems (e.g., ClearCase) mangle the contents and 
references to file differences.  This can stop a casual effort to modify files under CM 
control but a determined attacker can still make changes.  Note that this type of attack is 
undetectable without additional measures since it is not hard to change the timestamp on 
the file as well as its contents. 
There is no simple mitigation approach for this threat unless there is a willingness 
to trust the system administrators.  Basic steps can be taken such as locking down the 
filesystems so that only the CM administrator (and system administrator) can access 
them, but both the CM and System administrators would still have the ability to insert 
malicious code.  In addition, there is no guarantee that the CM system will remain 
uncompromised (and if it was compromised, that the breach would be detected).  For 
example, Microsoft discovered that their network was breached in 2000 and that hackers 
had access to their CM system over an extended period of time (Lopez, 2000).  Microsoft 
(as cited in Lopez, 2000) stated that the hack-in could have been an act of industrial 
espionage.  Thus it is possible that source code was infected with malicious code. 
If deemed necessary, the CM system can be segregated from the development 
system.  Thus code checkin/checkout would be done across a network.  If this model is 
adopted, either redundancy or hash verification can be used to reduce the chance that an 
attack will succeed.  Figure 28 shows how a development system can be used to detect 
tampering (or errors) in a single CM system.  By encapsulating the checkout/checkin 
routines (read/write from CM system) operations, this can be made transparent to the 
user.  When each development system obtains source code to work on, they read it from 
both CM systems simultaneously.  The results are then compared to make sure that both 
CM systems provide the same information.  As shown, only error detection is possible, 
but with additional CM systems, error correction could be added.  Multiple development 
systems are also required.  If only one system was provided, then an attacker could 
simply modify that single system and an error would not be detected (or local substitution 
of clean source for malicious source could occur).  Note that an attacker would either 
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need to penetrate both CM systems or multiple development systems.  Obviously it does 
not make sense to use the same CM or system administrator for both CM systems or all 



















to both CM 
Systems
 
Figure 28 - Cross-Checking CM Systems 
Another approach that could be used would be to archive cryptographic hashes of 
each source file as they are placed into the CM system and then verified as they are 
extracted.  In this approach, instead of a second CM system, a system would store and 
retrieve the cryptographic hashes created and verified by the development systems.  This 
approach eliminates the problem of re-syncing the CM systems should one crash. 
4. Toolchain Compromised 
This threat consists of replacing a tool (e.g., a compiler) that is used in the process 
of converting the source code into the final product.  This change allows the 
compromised tool to insert whatever code is desired into the final product.  Figure 29 
shows a sample toolchain that might be used to convert the source code into a load 
image.  Any of the tools that transform source code into object code or link object code 
and libraries into the final load image could add malicious code.  Anyone who has write 
access to the filesystem where the tools are stored can replace/modify one of these tools.  
This includes system administrators and sometimes CM administrators (since tool 



























Figure 29 - Example Toolchain 
 Two approaches are described to mitigate this threat.  First, the build tools can be 
validated as being unchanged since installation prior to the build procedure.  This 
validation can be done by using a cryptographic checksum (e.g., SHA-512).  This 
procedure guards against the possibility that the tools have been modified.  It is not 
foolproof however because the checksums are being generated on a potentially 
compromised machine (which can report the correct checksums even if the files are 
compromised).  Tools such as Tripwire (www.tripwire.com) and AIDE 
(aide.sourceforge.net) can reduce the odds of this being undetected.  Redundancy can 
also be used similar to the redundant CM system approach detailed previously.  A 
separate build system can build the installation in parallel and then the results can be 
compared.  This will only work if the attacker has not compromised both machines. 
5. User Build Control Compromised (e.g.,  Makefile Compromised) 
This threat is similar to a toolchain compromise, but is done against programmer 
provided toolchain control files.  Files such as Makefiles and scripts are written by 
programmers to control the build process.  They typically specify which source files, 
object files, and tools are used when building a product.  In addition, source file 
transformations are often performed in this manner (i.e., these files sometimes behave as 
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part of the toolchain).  Some of these files are considered part of the CM system and are 
written by a CM administrator.  These files may not be subject to code walkthroughs as 
they are not considered to be code.  In addition, these build control files are sometimes 
not even under CM control. 
It is recommended that build control files be treated as source code, undergo the 
same scrutiny as source code, and be stored under CM control.  Then the CM controlled 
version can be used to build the load image. 
6. Library File Replaced 
This threat is similar to a toolchain threat, but in this case, instead of replacing 
executable code, a library file (that contains compiled source code that will be linked to 
the compiled source code) is replaced with a library file containing compromised code.  It 
is called out separately since library files are sometimes managed differently from the 
toolchain. 
The same mitigation approaches used for protecting the toolchain are 
recommended for this threat. 
7. Load Image File Replaced (Assumes Image is not Stored under CM) 
Once built, the correctly built load image can still be replaced with a load image 
containing malicious code.  If the image is stored on a filesystem prior to delivery, 
anyone with write access to the portion of the filesystem containing the image can replace 
it with a malicious version. 
 It is recommended that the load image be stored under CM and using the same 
mitigation approaches used for protecting data in the CM system.  Another way to 
maintain assurance is to use two or more cryptographic hashes of the load image.  These 
cryptographic hashes can later be re-generated from the load image that is retrieved from 
storage and compared to the original hashes.  If the hashes match, the load image has not 
been tampered with. 
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Using more than one hash is recommended to guard against the possibility of a 
flaw being discovered in a cryptographic hash method.  Cryptographic hash functions 
have been broken5 in the past.  For example, SHA-1, GOST, and MD5 have been broken 
fairly recently (Schneier, 2005), (Mendel, Pramstaller, Rechberger, Kontak, & Szmidt, 
2008), (Sotirov, Stevens, Appelbaum, Lenstra, Molnar, Arne Osvik, & de Weger B., 
2008). 
Since there exists the possibility that an attacker with access to the load image 
may also have access to the hash repository, I further suggest that the cryptographic 
hashes be digitally signed. 
8. Wrong Load Image File Delivered 
During the delivery process itself, the image file can be replaced with a different 
image file.  This is viewed (2011) as an extremely common threat for files delivered 
electronically.  It is also possible to physically switch the delivery media. 
For electronic delivery, it is recommended that cryptographic techniques be used.  
Either the load image file can be digitally signed or a cryptographic checksum of the 
image file (such as was generated in the previous threat mitigation), delivered via an 
alternate path, can be used to verify that the image file received is what was sent.  The 
digital signature works by using a public/private key pair.  The load image is signed with 
the private key and the receiver of the load image verifies the signature by comparing 
against the public key.  As long as the private key remains private and an attacker is not 
able to substitute both the load image and the public key, this approach will provide 
assurance that the load image has not been modified. 
                                                 
5 Broken in this context implies that an attacker can generate the same hash result with a different file 
in computationally feasible time. 
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9. Load Image File Modified before Use 
In this threat, an attacker has access to the user’s copy of the load image file 
before it is loaded into the WRA.  I recommend verifying the load image immediately 
prior to use. 
10. WRA Loader Modified 
Obviously if the system used to program the WRA with the load image is 
compromised, it can be made to load anything.  Since the loader may be infrequently 
used, it is recommended that the loader never be connected to a network to reduce the 
chances that it can be compromised.  Systems such as AIDE (aide.sourceforge.net) can be 
used in combination with a bootable CD to verify that the system is unchanged since 
installation.  Note that many Windows bootable CDs actually use software on the 
Windows machine to run so it is important to make sure that no potentially compromised 
execution environment is used to verify that the execution environment is unchanged.  
One approach is to use a bootable Linux disc to mount and scan a Windows system. 
11. WRA Software Modified (after WRA is Programmed) 
Once the WRA is loaded, it may still be possible to modify the software and 
replace the load image with a malicious one.  There are multiple ways to handle this but it 
depends on the specific characteristics of the WRA.  Physical security can often be used.  
In some cases, the load image can be extracted and compared against an extract from a 
known clean WRA. 
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VI. USING CODE FROM UN-TRUSTED SOURCES OR WITH A 
BROKEN CUSTODY CHAIN 
A. VERIFYING SOURCE CODE AND TOOLSET WITH A KNOWN CLEAN 
LOAD IMAGE 
In some cases, there may be a clean load image but an uncontrolled source code 
and build environment.  For example, there may be a wish to use a WRA that has been 
widely used and has not exhibited malicious behavior.  Thus there may be an ability to 
claim that the pedigree of the WRA is good and that the WRA may be trusted.  This in 
turn implies that the pedigree of the load image within the WRA may be trusted.  It also 
means the original source code and build environment that was used to build the load 
image may be trusted.  However, there is no guarantee that the source code and the build 
environment today are the same as when the load image we trust was built. 
If a change is required to the load image, it would be desirable e to avoid the 
expense of full Software Assurance testing to re-validate the source code and build 
environment.  Our trust in the binary load image can be leveraged to provide assurance 
for the current source code and build environment.  The approach consists of the 
following steps: 
• Verify that the existing software baseline and toolset used match the clean 
image 
• Make the required changes to the software baseline 
• Test the impacted portion of the software baseline 
1. Verify Existing Software Baseline and Toolset 
Any changes, malicious or not, to either the existing software baseline or the 
toolset can be expected to result in a malicious (or at least different) load image than the 
load image created from the clean baseline and tools.  Any change to the source code 
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(other than formatting and comments) would result in a different binary image being 
generated.  Any change to a library (assuming the modified function is utilized) will 
likewise result in a different binary image. 
The reasoning associated with the actual toolchain is different. If an attacker 
changes the toolchain such that it always produces malicious code, then the binary image 
will differ.  Unlike the library and source code however, the toolchain is an executable 
and thus it is possible that malicious behavior of the toolchain may also operate based on 
a trigger.  However, if the attacker does not know that such a test will be made ahead of 
time, they have no ability to select an appropriate trigger.  They cannot trigger based on 
time (be malicious after such a date as they will not be able to determine the date), they 
cannot trigger of a change in the baseline (as they do not know what change will occur).  
Thus this type of issue is unlikely, assuming the Systems Engineer does not give the 
attacker warning. 
If it is possible to build the exact same, known clean binary image using the 
existing source baseline, libraries and toolchain, then (at the moment the source, libraries, 
and tools were used) we can conclude that these components are also clean.  Note that 
this requires trust in the underlying Configuration Management (CM) system, Operating 
System (OS), and network environment—otherwise there is no assurance that the files 
are the same from one moment to the next. 
In some cases, it is not convenient have a copy of a known good load image 
sitting on the shelf.  This situation can be addressed by programming a new WRA with 
the new load image and then extracting the images from the trusted WRA and the new 
WRA.  The images are then compared.  Note that it is not generally possible to compare 
the new load image to the extracted old load image since artifacts of the extraction 
process are likely to be present (e.g., memory address offsets, checksums). 
In some cases it will not be possible to extract a load image from a known good 
WRA.  Some WRAs provide no ability to extract an image.  In some cases, Anti-
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Tamper6 efforts take specific steps to prevent such extraction (http://at.dod.mil/).  Thus 
for new efforts it is important that digitally signed copies of load images be kept to avoid 
the need to extract the image in the future.  Note that Anti-Tamper methods that involve 
preventing image extraction (as opposed to those that rely on dynamic decryption of the 
load image) also prevent determining if a load image has been replaced with a malicious 
version once a WRA loaded with a clean load image leaves our control. 
Once either the new load image and the old load image or the extracted versions 
of both the old and new load images are obtained we can compare them to determine 
what, if any changes are present. 
If the load image does not match, bit for bit, then the conclusion is that something 
has changed.  The Systems Engineer will need to determine what has changed and if the 
changes are malicious.  There are techniques for determining which specific items have 
changed but they are beyond the scope of this thesis.  Once malicious code has been ruled 
out, the build environment can be accepted as clean. 
                                                 
6 Anti-Tamper is arguably misnamed.  It refers to preventing reverse engineering and can be thought 
of as Anti-Reverse Engineering. 
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VII. MAINTAINING TRUST IN CODE BASE AFTER 
VERIFICATION OF CODE AND TOOL BASE 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH 
We may need to be able to detect any changes in the known clean source code, 
libraries, and toolchain when changes are required at some point in the future.  To this 
end, a series of cryptographic hashes should be run across all of the source code, libraries, 
and toolchain (e.g., compilers, linkers, ...) components.  These cryptographic hashes can 
be used at a later time to verify that neither the source code nor the build environment has 
changed. 
The source code is updated as required, with appropriate CM control.  At this 
point, we can re-run the series of cryptographic snapshots and compare each snapshot on 
a file by file basis.  Any hashes that do not match will indicate which files were changed. 
 For source file changes, a simple “diff”7 can identify what lines of source code 
were modified.  Changes in the binary files would not be expected unless libraries or 
tools were upgraded—in which case it is possible to verify that the changes were 
innocuous. 
Once all the changes are accepted, the new set of cryptographic hashes becomes 
trusted. 
Finally, the new load image can be built using the updated baseline, libraries, and 
toolset. 
1. Generating Cryptographic Artifacts 
In order to generate cryptographic artifacts, cryptographic hash for each file that 
is to be tracked is calculated.  These hashes can then be collected into a container archive 
(e.g., Tar, Zip, …) and then digitally signed.  Many systems have cryptographic hash 
 
                                                 
7 A “Diff” tool compares two or more files and outputs the differences between them 
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software available.  On UNIX and UNIX-like systems, standard tools can be used 
together to generate artifacts for entire directory trees.  Figure 30 below shows a simple 
example for a UNIX system. 
#! /bin/sh
#
# Demo program to show cryptographic signature 






find "$CODEBASE" -type f -exec $SHA "{}" >>"$CSDB" \; 
 
Figure 30 - Simple Script to Generate Artifacts in Directory Tree 
2. Verifying Cryptographic Artifacts 
The previously generated cryptographic artifacts can be used to verify that the 
build environment remains unchanged.  When we need to verify that the build 
environment remains unchanged, we can re-generate the artifacts from the current 
(potentially different) codebase and compare them to the existing artifact set.  If the 
artifacts match, then we can conclude that the build environment remains unchanged. 




# Demo program to show cryptographic signature






touch "$CSDB"; touch "$CSDBNEW"
find "$CODEBASE" -type f -exec $SHA "{}" >>"$CSDBNEW" \; 
cat $CSDB $CSDBNEW | sort | uniq -u
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VIII. DOCUMENTING THE SWA PROCESS 
A. GOAL STRUCTURING NOTATION (GSN) FOR SOFTWARE 
ASSURANCE (SWA) 
 Kelly (1998) proposed using Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) as a method for 
“clearly expressing and presenting safety arguments.”  GSN is a type of goal-based 
assurance.  Since 1994 there has been a trend toward explicit goal based approaches for 
system safety justification (Bishop, P, Bloomfield, R., & Guerra, S., 2004).  As such, this 
type of approach should be familiar to Systems Safety personnel and Systems Engineers 
alike and thus provide a common framework for addressing and documenting potential 
issues and mitigation steps. I propose using GSN in a similar manner to document 
Software Assurance (SwA) cases. 
 The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) approach is based on making a “claim” 
about the software assurance associated with a system.  Each claim is then supported with 




Figure 32 - GSN Elements 
 
 As the evidence can be a decomposition of one or more other claims, we end up 
with a hierarchical graphical “argument” supporting a SwA claim.  This relationship is 
shown in Figure 33.  Note that the “context” elements from GSN, although they could be 
used to provide amplifying information about the reasoning.  Also note that when 
multiple sub-claims or pieces of evidence are presented, all sub-elements must be 















Figure 33 - Hierarchical Claim Argument 
 Figure 34 shows a sample system level SwA case.  Note that the system claim is 
supported by claims about its components (WRAs that contain software). 
 




If malicious code is 
Present in WRA “A”, 
it can do no damage
If malicious code is 
Present in WRA “B”, 
it can do no damage
If malicious code is 
Present in WRA “X”, 







Figure 34 - Example Top Level SwA Case 
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 The claims about each WRA are supported by evidence (in this case, a separate 
SwA case for each WRA).  In some cases, the system itself may require additional 
supporting arguments to rule out system design threats.  
 Figure 35 shows a sample SwA case for WRA “A.”  In this example, WRA “A” 
has no external interfaces (so there is no need to worry about external vulnerabilities).  
This is supported by the System Architecture diagram (that will show that WRA “A” has 
no external connections).  Note that any change to this piece of evidence would require 
re-evaluation on this claim.  Internal WRAs can contain malicious code, so we verify that 
no “trigger” information (e.g., date, altitude, GPS location, etc …) is available to the 
WRA on its internal interfaces.  Although a review of an Interface Design Description 
(IDD) or similar document might be trusted, the actual interface (in case non-documented 
data is present) may also require monitoring.  The WRA could simply fail after a few 
hours of run-time (it is  assumed that the WRA can tell how long it has been running), or 
may even contain overt malicious code so there is a need to verify that the testing was 






If malicious code is 
Present in WRA “A”, 
it can do no damage
WRA “A” has 
no external 
interfaces
WRA “A” receives 
no “trigger” 
information






















Figure 35 - Example SwA Case for WRA “A” 
 Since it might be possible for multiple-level attacks to exploit the WRA on an 
internal interface, there may also be a wish to have a SwA case for all the other connected 
WRAs.  Since protecting against multi-level attacks greatly expands the work-load, there 
may be a wish to specify that such protection is excluded if the overall risk posed by 
malicious code to the system is limited. 
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IX. APPLICATION OF STUDY 
A. RELEVANT SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS 
The approaches discussed in this thesis rely on a few key system characteristics.  
Other systems that share some or all of these attributes of embedded airborne systems 
may find the work useful.  The key characteristics of embedded airborne systems that we 
depend on are:  
• Embedded System – because the system is embedded, the software 
associated with the WRAs (system components) is static, with a limited 
ability for an attacker to replace the software. 
• No network connectivity – because airborne systems are (for the most 
part) devoid of network connectivity, we tend to have a limited number of 
data sources to worry about. 
• Limited connectivity – because airborne systems tend to have point to 
point connections, we can make a distinction between external and 
internal interface threats.  
• Significant testing – because airborne systems have many safety critical 
components, special testing (specifically DO-178B statement coverage 
testing in this case) is required.  Other systems may have similar testing 
requirements for other, non-safety reasons (e.g., Information Assurance 
critical subsystems) 
B. EXAMPLES 
Some examples of specific systems that may find the work in this thesis relevant 
are: 
• Airborne embedded systems – this thesis was specifically designed to address 
these 
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• Industrial embedded systems – many industrial systems use embedded control 
systems.  Devices such as Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) Milling 
Machines and Lathes are extremely dangerous if a software failure occurs.  As 
such, there is a specific safety risk for these systems that requires extensive 
testing.  The systems have limited connectivity and are typically dedicated to 
the control of a single machine. 
• Medical equipment – medical testing equipment, life support equipment, and 
implanted devices share the required characteristics.  Some medical test 
equipment (e.g., an X-Ray machine) has the ability to cause harm if it 
malfunctions.  Even when the system cannot directly cause harm, 
misinformation from the system can lead to inappropriate action (or inaction) 
based on the incorrect results.  Life support equipment must operate correctly 
or death may occur.  Similarly implanted medical devices such as pacemakers 
or drug delivery systems also carry the risk of death to a patient should they 
malfunction.  Most of these systems have extremely limited connectivity and 
are associated with a specific device. 
• Electronic voting systems – Electronic voting systems are typically embedded 
systems with extremely limited interfaces.  Some systems (e.g., the Accuvote 
TS) have been compromised and de-certified.  As a result, the systems are 
expected to undergo rigorous testing. 
• Air traffic control systems – Many sub-systems within the nation’s air traffic 
control system are embedded systems with limited connectivity.  They have 
the ability to cause loss of life should they fail, as such they require significant 
testing. 
• Nuclear power control systems – many of the system components are safety 
critical, control limited aspects of the system, have limited connectivity, and 
have significant testing requirements. 
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• National electric grid control systems – the national electric grid system is 
expected to provide real-time, fault tolerant control of the nation’s electric 
supply.  Embedded systems control generators and switches and can cause 
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X. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis answers the following questions: 
• How can a System Engineer mitigate the risks posed by malicious code in 
embedded systems used in aircraft?  
A Systems Engineer can mitigate the risks by a combination of: malicious 
code detection methods; reduction in the chances that malicious code will 
be inserted into the software anywhere in the development, deployment, 
and maintenance life cycle; techniques to prevent extant malicious code 
from causing harm; and tight control of the integrity of software. 
• What methods can we use to detect the presence of malicious code in 
embedded systems used in aircraft? 
A Systems Engineer can utilize a combination of static and dynamic 
detection techniques to locate malicious code.  Although static analysis is 
not particularly effective, certain dynamic detection techniques can cause 
software that contains malicious code to fail during testing.  Certain 
techniques such as code-walkthroughs and coverage testing can be 
leveraged to detect the presence of overt embedded malicious code.   
• How can we reduce the risk that malicious code will be inserted into the 
source code for embedded systems used in aircraft? 
Simple changes to the software development process can be made to 
reduce the chances that malicious code is inserted into an embedded 
aircraft system.  These include techniques such: as requiring software 
check-in to a Configuration Management (CM) system before code 
walkthroughs and testing; encryption techniques to verify the integrity of 
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the CM system and build toolchain; and formal documentation procedures 
to reduce the chance that a vulnerability will remain unaddressed. 
• How can we prevent malicious code in embedded systems used in aircraft 
from causing harm? 
By controlling the information available to a Weapons Replaceable 
Assembly (WRA), a Systems Engineer can often prevent potential “trigger 
conditions” from occurring within the malicious code.  This in turn will 
result in a condition whereby the malicious code (if present) will either 
always fail (and be detected during testing), or never fail (and thus cause 
no harm). 
• How can we maintain the integrity of the software in an embedded 
system? 
The integrity of software throughout the development, deployment, and 
maintenance life cycle of a program can by maintained through the use of 
cryptographic hashes and digital signatures.  These techniques can be 
augmented through the use of multiple independent CM systems.  When 
properly employed, these techniques can provide assurance that the 
software has: not been modified; or that only known modifications have 
occurred. 
A basic tenet of Systems Engineering is to bound the problem.  In this case, it is 
necessary to be completely certain that software contains no malicious code.  The goal 
should be to state that if any malicious code is present it cannot cause harm.  This is an 
important distinction because it may well prove impossible to prove the negative.  After 
all, if covert malicious code is present but does not actually do anything malicious, how 
would we detect it? 
By using system level information combined with basic knowledge about how 
malicious code operates, a Systems Engineer has tools available that are not available to 
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WRA manufacturers, Programmers, or Software Engineers.  This system level 
information can allow the Systems Engineer to quantify the risks posed by malicious 
software and in many cases completely mitigate them.  Although certain WRAs (e.g., 
those that require “trigger” information to operate), cannot (using the techniques 
presented in this thesis) have their malicious code risk reduced to zero, decomposition of 
these WRAs into sub-elements and a combination of static and dynamic analysis on 
troublesome elements can greatly reduce the remaining risk. 
By documenting a Systems Software Assurance case using a GSN approach, a 
Systems Engineer can effectively track and communicate the SwA mitigation steps along 
with the reasons why each of the steps are needed.  This communication may help “sell” 
the expense that implementing the SwA cases will incur. 
Certain characteristics of Embedded Airborne Avionics software can be leveraged 
to reduce the cost associated with implementing SwA.  Many system and software safety 
requirements can be used as supporting evidence for SwA claims at no additional cost.  
For example, DO-178B statement coverage testing requirements can mitigate the risk of 
overt malicious software and the associated hazard analysis or safety assessment may be 
helpful in determining which system WRAs require SwA efforts and which do not.  
System testing requirements may be helpful in meeting some additional SwA evidence 
requirements. 
The basic approach taken in this thesis is “divide and conquer” where we 
decompose the system risk down into risks posed by individual WRAs and in some cases 
further decompose individual WRAs to allow similar analysis techniques to be used on 
WRA elements. 
It is recommended that a system level approach (such as presenting in this thesis) 
be used to allocate SwA risks to individual WRAs and that high risk WRAs be primarily 
handled by managing their inputs.  For WRAs that cannot have potential “trigger” 
information removed, the WRA should be further decomposed (to limit the size of the 
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problem) and the techniques presented in the static analysis and particularly the dynamic 
analysis sections be used to reduce the risk posed. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 Strategies to deal with WRAs that depend on trigger information should be more 
fully developed and ways to more fully calculate the residual risk should be developed.  
Additionally, work to deal with statistical triggers may prove useful.  Specific research 
into specific characteristics of other software systems such as those called out in Chapter 
IX may allow different cost saving strategies for implementing the basic concepts 
detailed in this thesis. 
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